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REGULATING CARCINOGENS IN FOOD: A 
LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE FOOD 
SAFETY PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL 
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 
Richard A. Merrill*t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 9, 1977, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
announced that a study in laboratory rats conducted by the Ca-
nadian government confirmed that saccharin is an animal carcin-
ogen.• For this reason, the agency stated, the sweetener must be 
banned from human food. 
The FDA's announcement triggered public incredulity and 
congressional demands for revision of the nation's legal frame-
work for regulating food safety. Critics of the agency's action 
focused on the much publicized Delaney Clause of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2 They characterized this provi-
sion, which forbids the approval of any "food additive" shown to 
induce cancer in man or in animals, 3 as outdated and several 
critics also ridiculed the test methods used to evaluate the safety 
* Daniel Caplin Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. A.B. 1959, 
LL.B. 1964, Columbia University; M.A. 1966, Oxford University.-Ed. 
t © Copyright Richard A. Merrill 1979. The author was Chief Counsel of the United 
States Food and Drug Administration from 1975-1977. The views expressed in this Article 
are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the FDA or of any agency official. An 
earlier version of the Article appears as Appendix B to Food Safety in the United States, 
Part 2 of the Report of the Committee for a Study of Saccharin and Food Safety Policy of 
the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences 
(March 1979). 
I wish to express my appreciation for the advice and helpful criticism of several 
colleagues, notably Peter Barton Hutt, Stuart Pape, Marshall Shapo, and Dr. Joseph 
Rodricks, and for the assistance of Mark Colley and James Davis of the Class of 1980 and 
the Class of 1979, respectively, at the University of Virginia School of Law. 
1. Statement of Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs (March 
9, 1977) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
2. 21 U.S.C. § 301-92 (1976)[hereinafter cited as "the Act"]. 
3. The original Delaney Clause appears in section 409(c) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1976), and reads as follows: 
Provided, that no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer 
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are appropriate 
for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or ani-
mal. ... 
As subsequently explained in more detail, functionally identical language appears in 
the provisions of the Act dealing with color additives and drugs administered to animals 
that are used to produce human food. See notes 44-45 infra and accompanying text. 
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of food ingredients.4 Reacting to these criticisms and to the pub-
lic's apparent indignation at the imminent abolition of the only 
non-nutritive sweetener approved in this country for use in foods, 
Congress in late 1977 enacted the Saccharin Study and Labeling 
Act. 5 This legislation forbade any FDA action against saccharin 
for eighteen months and directed the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare to arrange for separate studies of the safety and 
benefits of saccharin and of the current laws regulating food 
safety. The latter study and a major part of the former were 
subsequently undertaken by the Institute of Medicine of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences. 
The studies which Congress mandated, to be accompanied 
by the recommendations of the Secretary of HEW, 6 are likely to 
generate a fundamental reexamination of the nation's current 
food safety policies. This Article attempts to aid this inquiry by 
explaining the requirements of the present law. The Article de-
scribes the several statutory provisions that govern the regulation 
of food constituents and analyzes the FDA's implementation of 
them. Its primary objective is to provide a common starting place 
for discussion of the contours of future policy. A subsequent arti-
cle will examine in detail various approaches to regulating risks 
posed by food and recommend specific reforms of the present law. 
Readers should be advised that the Article starts from the 
premise that many features of the present law are outdated and 
require revision. In that sense, the Article may lack objectivity. I 
have conscientiously attempted, however, to reserve judgment 
about the directions of future policy and to assure that my de-
scription and analysis are historically accurate. 
A continuing refrain in the furor over saccharin was the claim 
that the law dictates an overreaction to some trivial risks while 
allowing much graver hazards-cigarette smoking is the recurrent 
4. For descriptions of the reaction, see, e.g., The Great Saccharin Snafu, CONSUMER 
REP., July 1977, at 410; Demkovich, Saccharin's Dead, Dieters Are Blue, What Is Congress 
Going To Do?, NATL. J., June 4, 1977, at 856; Wolff, 0/ Rats and Men, N.Y. TIMES, May 
15, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 88; Hines & Randal, Behind the Saccharin Uproar, THE 
PROGRESSIVE, June 1977, at 13. Epitomizing the exaggerated reaction of many nonecien-
tists was the proposal of Congressman Andrew Jacobs to amend the law to permit the 
continued sale of saccharin accompanied by the warning: "The Canadians have deter-
mined saccharin is dangerous to your rat's health." See Cancer and Your Sweet Tooth, 
NEW REPUBLIC, March 26, 1977, at 7, 8. 
5. Pub. L. No. 95-203, 91 Stat. 1451 (codified in sections of21 U.S.C.A. (West 1977)). 
For discussions of Congress's motives, see H.R. REP. No. 658, 95th Cong., let Sees. 6-11 
(1977); S. REP. No. 353, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-10 (1977). 
6. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 2, 91 Stat. 1451 (1977) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(n) (West Supp. 1978)). 
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example-to remain uncontrolled. As the Article demonstrates, 
the aggregation of statutory provisions governing food safety rep-
resents a patchwork of divergent, sometimes carefully considered 
but as often offhand, legislative policies which invite inconsistent 
treatment of comparable risks. The Delaney Clause illustrates 
this general characteristic, not because it produces controversial 
results, but because it applies inconsistently, without regard to 
the actual risks posed or the benefits provided by various classes 
of food constituents. The unequivocal instruction of the Delaney 
Clause magnifies the practical significance of the distinctions 
among categories of food constituents that the law now recog-
nizes.7 These distinctions are the product of the sedimentary pro-
cess by which the current law, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act, has been created. Beginning in 1938, 8 Congress has on 
a half dozen occasions authorized the FDA (or its predecessors) 
to deal with specified categories of food hazards-addressing, 
first, pesticide residues; then food additives generally; later, color 
additives; and finally drugs used in the production of food ani-
mals.9 Typically, Congress has added new provisions without re-
placing, and often without modifying, those already in the law. 
Furthermore, it has often failed to explain how the new standards 
mesh with the old. 
While the importance of historical context in explaining the 
enactment and implementation of several provisions in the Act 
invites a chronological treatment, the practical implications of 
the Act's disparate treatment of different classes of food constitu-
ents can better be understood by considering the categories that 
constitute the FDA's jurisdiction. The legislator evaluating what 
kind of food-safety legislation should be enacted is probably more 
interested in how the law now operates than in how it came to 
7. See R. Kingham, Statutory and Administrative Theories by Which FDA Avoids 
Applying the Delaney Clause (Nov. 10, 1977)(unpublished manuscript on file with au-
thor). 
8. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 717, ch. 675, 
§ 402(a), 52 Stat. 1046 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a) (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938). 
9. See in historical sequence, Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra 
note 8; Act of July 22, 1954, Pub. L. No. 518, ch. 559, 68 Stat. 511 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 346a (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954); Food Addi-
tives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 4, 72 Stat. 1785 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 348 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Food Additives Amendment of 1958); Color Additive 
Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, tit. I, § 103(b), 74 Stat. 399 (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 376 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Color Additives Amendments of 1960); and 
Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-399, § lOl(b), 82 Stat. 343 (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 360b (1976)) [hereinafter cited as Animal Drug Amendments qf 1968). 
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be. Accordingly, this Article follows legal categories in describing 
how the Act and the FDA regulate food safety. Most of these 
categories are defined by the origin of food constituents, i.e., how 
the constituents become part of food. 
The main part of the Article, Part III, analyzes the legal 
standards applicable to these several categories of food constitu-
ents. First, however, Part II surveys the Act's food-safety provi-
sions and discusses the origin and interpretation of the Delaney 
Clause, the provision that triggered the FDA's action against sac-
charin and that is the focus of the current debate over food safety 
policy. 
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW 
A. The Food-Safety Provisions of the Act 
1. The 1938 Act and Its Precursor 
The first federal statute governing food safety, the Food and 
Drugs Act of 1906, declared adulterated any food that contained 
"any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient 
which may render such article injurious to health." 10 The early 
law did not mention hazards posed by constituents other than 
those ''added" to food, 11 a term not defined in the statute but 
understood to embrace substances used as ingredients or inten-
tionally applied during processing. When Congress wrote the 
present Act in 1938, it wanted to expand the 1906 law's controls 
over toxicants in food. Accordingly, without apparent limitation 
to "added" substances, section 402(a)(l) of the Act12 declares 
adulterated any food that "bears or contains any poisonous or 
deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health." 
Almost as an afterthought, however, Congress qualified this stan-
dard as it applies to food constituents that are not added: "[B]ut 
in case the substance is not an added substance such food shall 
not be considered adulterated under this clause if the quantity of 
such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious 
to health."13 The 1938 Act thus retained the distinction between 
substances that are "added" and those that are not, but, like the 
1906 law, neglected to define "added." 
10. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938), 
11. Id.§ 7. 
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 402(a)(l) (codified 
at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976)). 
13. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of this provision, see note 59 infra. 
December 1978] Regulating Carcinogens 175 
The statutory standard for non-added toxicants has re-
mained unchanged since 1938; the "ordinarily injurious" test is 
still the legal measure of whether a substance that occurs natu-
rally in foods, e.g., nitrites in spinach, adulterates the food. Con-
gress has, however, made several changes in the law governing 
added constituents of food. In the 1938 Act itself, Congress recog-
nized that certain added toxicants in foods required special treat-
ment. In section 406, 14 it empowered the FDA to establish toler-
ances for added poisonous or deleterious substances whose occur-
rence in food "cannot be avoided" or whose use is "necessary" 
to produce the food. In substance, Congress authorized the FDA 
to license the use of some potentially toxic substances in food, 
apparently in recognition of their utility or of the importance of 
foods from which they cannot practicably be eliminated. Con-
gress's primary objective apparently was to permit the continued 
use of pesticides on many agricultural commodities. · 
With the passage of the 1938 Act, therefore, federal law regu-
lated toxicants in foods under three different standards: (1) sec-
tion 402(a)(l)'s ''ordinarily injurious" standard applied to con-
stituents that were not added; (2) section 402(a)(l)'s "may render 
injurious" test applied to added constituents that were neither 
necessary or unavoidable; and (3) added constituents whose use 
was "necessary in the production of a food" or whose occur-. 
rence was "unavoidable by good manufacturing practice" were 
eligible for tolerance setting under section 406. · 
2. Post-1938 Amendments to the Act 
The original triad of controls has been complicated by subse-
quent amendments to the 1938 Act. Each amendment deals with 
one category of the broad class of "added" food constituents and 
empowers the FDA to limit the use, or the occurrence, of poten-
tially toxic substances in or on food. The first of these amend-
ments was the Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954, now sec-
tion 408 of the Act. 15 This provision was intended to complement 
the authority then residing in the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) to register pesticides for use in the United 
States. The amendment provides, in substance, that a raw agri-
cultural commodity shall be deemed adulterated if it bears any 
14. 21 u.s.c. § 346 (1976). 
15. Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954, supra note 9. Section 408 is codified at 
21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976). 
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residue of a pesticide that does not conform to a tolerance estab-
lished under section 408, 16 and details an elaborate procedure for 
establishing tolerances. 17 
.In 1958, Congress carved out for special treatment another 
category of added constituents of food. The Food Additives 
Amendment, section 409 of the Act, 18 establishes a licensure 
scheme, similar in concept to that for pesticide residues, for sub-
stances intended to be used as ingredients in formulated foods. 
The amendment also applies to substances that, through use in 
articles such as packaging which contact food, become or can 
"reasonably be expected" to become components of food. 19 A food 
that contains a food additive whose use the FDA has not ap-
proved as "safe," or that contains an approved food additive in a 
quantity exceeding limits specified by the agency, is adulterated 
under section 402(a)(2)(C) of the Act.20 By congressional design, 
the Food Additives Amendment does not apply to all intention-
ally added ingredients in food or to all substances that may mi-
grate to food. The two most important exceptions are substances 
whose use in food is "generally recognized as safe by qualified 
experts"-an exception embracing a large number of substances, 
such as sugar and salt-and substances that either the FDA or 
the USDA "sanctioned" for use in food prior to 1958. 21 
In 1960, Congress addressed the more limited problem of 
substances used to color foods, drugs, cosmetics, and medical 
devices. 22 Colors derived from coal tar dyes had been regulated 
under a "harmless per se" standard,23 which many could not 
meet, while other food colors had been regulated under the gen-
eral safety provisions of the Act, notably section 402(a)(l). Unlike 
the Food Additives Amendment, 24 the Color Additive Amend-
ments2.5 apply to all substances used to impart color to food; the 
16. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a)-(b) (1976). 
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)-(h) (1976) and text accompanying notes 103-05 infra. 
18. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9. Section 409 is codified at 21 
u.s.c. § 348 (1976). 
19. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9, § 2 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(s) (1976)). 
20. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976). 
21. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). For a detailed discussion of the Food Additives Amend• 
ment, see text accompanying notes 113-39 infra. 
22. See Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9. 
23. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 406(b) (re• 
pealed 1960). For a detailed discussion of the FDA's implementation of this provision, see 
Flemming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153 (1958). 
24. See text at note 18 supra. 
25. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 101 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(t) (1976)). 
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amendments do .not except colors that are recognized by experts 
as safe or that were approved for use prior to 1960. The amend-
ments require FDA approval, or "listing," for any use of a color. 26 
A food that bears or contains a color additive whose use in food 
the FDA has not approved, or whose use deviates from the terms 
of any approval, is adulterated under section 402(c) of the Act.27 
The most recent modification of the 1938 Act that is relevant 
in this context was part of the Animal Drug Amendments of 
1968.28 After 1958, drugs administered to food-producing animals 
were regulated under a combination of statutory provi-
sions-under section 409 as well as section 505 for drugs that were 
administered directly to animals and that "could reasonably be 
expected" to leave residues in human food, and under section 409 
alone for compounds incorporated in animal feeds.29 In 1968, Con-
gress sought to simplify the procedure for evaluating drugs used 
in food-producing animals by prescribing a unified licensure sys-
tem under section 512.30 Under the amended Act, no animal drug 
that is likely to leave residues in edible tissue of livestock may 
be used, nor may food containing residues be marketed, without 
prior FDA approval.31 
Thus, by 1968 Congress had divided the broad class of added 
constituents of human food into several categories, each subject 
to special regulatory requirements. Broadly speaking, Congress 
required that individual substances be presented to the FDA for 
approval prior to use, and that the agency find a substance safe 
for human consumption when used as proposed. As will be evi-
dent, however, this general mandate has been expressed in differ-
ent statutory terms, which have not only contributed to the ap-
pearance of inconsistency in the regulation of food safety, but 
have exaggerated the significance of the initial classification of 
substances. 
An instructive illustration derives from the fact that the four 
categories of food constituents given special attention by Con-
26. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 706(h)(l) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 376(b) (1976)). 
27. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 102(a)(2) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 342(c) (1976)). 
28. Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, supra note 9 (codified principally et 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360b (1976)). 
29. See generally H.R. REP. No. 875, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. REP. No. 1308, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
30. Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, supra note 9, § lOl(b) (codified et 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360b (1976)). 
31. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2)(D), 360b(a)(l) (1976). 
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gress since 1938 do not, in the FDA's view, ex:tiaust the.class of 
added constituents. Neither in 1938 nor subsequently has Con-
gress specifically addressed the problem of environmental con-
taminants, such as PCBs and mercury, whose occurrence in food 
is unintended and, to a large degree, uncontrollable. The agency 
could have regulated such contaminants under the "may render 
injurious" language of section 402(a)(l) or, indeed, under the 
"ordinarily injurious" language of section 402(a)(l), but neither 
provision authorizes it to determine what levels of such contami-
nants should be tolerated. Since the early 1970s, therefore, the 
FDA has classified environmental contaminants as unavqidable 
"added poisonous or deleterious substances" in order to trigger its 
tolerance-setting authority under section 406. 32 The difficulty of 
controlling contaminants in food and the breadth of section 406's 
criteria, however, have led the agency to sanction levels of expo-
sure to environmental contaminants that contrast sharply with 
its intolerance of potentially toxic, intentional ingredients, such 
as saccharin. 33 The relative difficulty of controlling human expo-
sure in the two situations could explain this discrepant treatment 
of ostensibly similar hazards without reference to the statute. But 
a second explanation lies in the Delaney Clause, which codifies 
the Food Additives Amendment's basic "no risk" policy for inten-
tional food constituents, thus precluding for saccharin the kind 
of inquiry that is permitted under section 406 or the pesticide 
residue section. Accordingly, it is appropriate at this point to 
examine the origins and interpretation of this controversial provi-
sion. 
B. History and Impact of the Delaney Clause 
The Delaney Clause is perhaps the most discussed, yet least 
used, provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. It 
became law in 1958 as part of the Food Additives Amendment, 
in which Congress for the first time required premarket testing of 
32. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substance in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 
(1974). 
33. For example, the FDA estimates that the consumption of one can each day of a 
soft drink sweetened with saccharin increases the risk of bladder cancer of between zero 
and four in 10,000. See Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 20,001 (1977). By 
contrast, the risk of cancer associated with average consumption of products bearing 
permitted levels of aflatoxin contamination is, by the agency's own estimate based on 
animal studies, somewhere between 240 and 1100 per 100,000 population. See Assessment 
of Estimated Risk Resulting from Aflatoxins in Consumer Peanut Products and Other 
Food Commodities 2 (Food and Drug Administration Report, January 19, 1978), 
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most intentional food ingredients.34 Prior to 1958, the Act con-
trolled the safety of food constituents primarily through section 
402(a)'s dual proscriptions against distribution of adulterated 
food.35 These proscriptions were enforced through court action, 
usually seizures, instituted by the Department of Justice upon 
the FDA's recommendation. The agency could not require manu-
facturers to test the safety of food constituents, 36 and had never 
formally exercised its authority under the original section 406 to 
prescribe tolerances for potentially toxic chemicals in food. 37 The 
Food Additives Amendment thrust the FDA squarely into the 
business of licensing food ingredients by requiring the agency to 
determine whether any "food additive" was safe for its intended 
use.38 . 
Stimulated by hearings chaired by Congressman James De-
laney of New York,39 the Food Additives Amendment was the 
product of lengthy congressional consideration of proposals to 
regulate chemicals in food. The investigating subcommittee's 
work led first to the passage in-1954 of the amendment permitting 
the FDA to establish t9lerances for pesticide resjdues on raw agri-
cultural commodities. 40 The Food Additives Amendment, en-
34. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). See C. DUNN, LEGISLATIVE RECORD OF 1958 Foon 
ADDITIVES AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL FooD, DRUG, AND CosMFmc ACT (CCH Food Law Insti-
tute Series 1958). 
35. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l)-(a)(2) (1976). 
36. Pesticide residues on raw agricultural commodities were an exception to this 
general statement. In 1954, Congress had established a system for "licensing" pesticide 
residues that had been shown to be safe. Pesticide Residue Amendments of 1954, supra 
note 9 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976)). See note 15 supra and accompanying text. 
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1976); Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. 
Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974). 
38. Section 409(c) of the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9, provides: 
(c)(l) The Secretary shall-
(A) by order establish a regulation • • • prescribing, with respect to one or 
more proposed uses of the food additive involved, the conditions under which 
such additive may be safely used • . . . 
(3) No such regulation shall issue if a fair evaluation of the data before the 
Secretary-
(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive, under the 
conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe: Provided, that 
no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found ... , after tests which 
are appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of good additives, to induce 
cancer in man or animal • • . • · 
' 39. Hearings Before the House Select Comm. To Investigate the Use of Chemicals in 
Foods and Cosmetics, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. and 82d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1950-1952) 
(popularly known as the "Delaney Committee" hearings); see H.R. REP. No. 2356, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). 
40. Pesticide Residue Amendments of 1954, supra note 9. 
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acted four years later, was addressed mainly to intentional food 
ingredients. The clause that bears Congressman Delaney's name 
was not part of the legislation introduced in the House, 41 but was 
an amendment from the House floor after the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, on behalf of the FDA, withdrew 
its objection that the clause was redundant. 42 
The Delaney Clause now appears in three provisions of the 
Act: the 1958 Food Additives Amendment (now Section 
409(c)(3)(A)),43 the Color Additive Amendments of 1960 (now sec-
tion 706(b)(5)(B)),44 and the Animal Drug Amendments of 1968 
(now section 512(d)(l)(H)).45 While the Clause's three versions 
differ slightly in language, 46 their basic thrust is similar-to pre-
vent the addition to food of any substance that has been shown 
41. H.R. 13254, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). 
42. 104 CONG. R.Ec. 17,412, 17,415 (1958). The letter from the Department withdraw-
ing the agency's objection to the Delaney Clause stated in part: 
Id. 
The widespread interest in cancer led to suggestions that the food additives 
legislation should mention the disease by name and forbid the approval of any 
substance that is found upon test to cause cancer in test animals. This Department 
is in complete accord with the intent of these suggestions • • • . H.R. 132541 as 
approved by [the] committee, will accomplish this intent . . •• 
To single out one class of diseases for special mention would be anomalous and 
could be misinterpreted. Hence, . . . we chose general language that would restrain 
any use of any additive that would have an adverse effect on the public health. 
At the same time, if it would serve to allay any lingering apprehension on the 
part of those who desire an explicit statutory mandate on this point, the Depart-
ment would interpose no objection to appropriate mention of cancer in food addi-
tives legislation. 
43. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). 
44. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1976). 
45. 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(l)(H) (1976). 
46. All three provisions prohibit the use of substances in products that may be swal-
lowed if those substances are shown to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal or 
are shown to induce cancer by other appropriate tests. Thus, tests in which an additive is 
administered by a route other than ingestion must be determined, in the first instance by 
the FDA, to be "appropriate" before the Delaney Clause applies. The clause applicable 
to color additives bars the approval of a carcinogenic color for any use "which will or may 
result in ingestion of all or part of such additive." This language leaves open the possibility 
that a carcinogenic color additive could be used to enhance the appearance of certain parts 
of foods (e.g., husks, rinds, shells) ifit were certain the color would not contaminate edible 
portions of the food. 
The Food Additives Amendment permits the approval of a carcinogenic additive for 
use in animal feed if the additive will neither adversely affect the animals nor leave any 
measurable residue in edible portions of slaughtered animals or in food yielded by living 
animals. A similar exception is made for carcinogenic animal drugs which neither harm 
animals nor leave residues in food products derived from treated animals. See 21 U.S.C. 
348(c)(3)(A) (1976). This exception to the Delaney Clause is explored in detail in the text 
at notes 225-50, infra. 
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to induce cancer in man or laboratory animals. The language of 
section 409(c)(3)(A) is exemplary: 
No such regulation [authorizing use of a food additive] shall issue 
if a fair evaluation of the data before the Secretary-
(A) fails to establish that the proposed use of the food addi-
tive, under the conditions of use to be specified in the regulation, 
will be safe: Provided, that no additive shall be deemed to be safe 
if it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or 
if it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation 
of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or ani-
mal. ... 47 
This language seems unequivocal, and certain consequences 
of the Clause are obvious. It accords the same-decisive-weight 
to evidence that a substance induces cancer in animals as to 
evidence of cancer in man. (Accordingly, when this Article refers 
to a carcinogen, or to a finding of carcinogenicity, it assumes, 
unless otherwise noted, that the characterization is based on one 
or more experiments in laboratory animals. Such experiments 
have become the primary mode for evaluating the safety of food 
constituents.) In addition, the Delaney Clause allows no room for 
consideration of dose; it presumes, as a matter of law, that no 
level of exposure to an animal carcinogen can be .considered safe. 48 
However, several critical terms in the Clause are undefined, in-
cluding terms-such as "induce," "cancer," and "tests·appropri-
ate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives"49-that are 
47. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). 
48. During hearings on the Color Additive Amendments, Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare Arthur Flemming endorsed the conclusion of a National Cancer Institute 
report: "No one at this time can tell how much or how little of a carcinogen would be 
required to produce cancer in any human being, or how long it would take the cancer to 
develop." Color Additives: Hearings on H.R. 7624 and S. 2197 Before the House Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1960). He went on to state, 
We have no basis for asking Congress to give us discretion to establish a safe 
tolerance for a substance which definitely has been shown to produce cancer when 
added to the diet oftest animals. We simply have no basis on which such discretion 
could be exercised because no one can tell us with any assurance at all how to 
establish a safe dose of any cancer-producing substances. 
Id. at 62, See Blank, The Delaney Clause: Technical Naivete and Scientific Advocacy in 
the Formulation of Public Health Policies, 62 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 1084 (1974); Turner, The 
Delaney Anticancer Clause: A Model Environmental Protection Law, 24 VAND. L. R.Ev. 
889 (1971). 
49. "[T]he opposition to inclusion of an anticancer clause arises largely out of a 
misunderstanding of how this provision works. It allows the Department and its scientific 
people full discretion and judgment in deciding whether a substance has been shown to 
cause cancer .... " Color Additives: Hearings on H.R. 7624 and S. 2197 Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 501 (1960) (statement 
of HEW Secretary Arthur S. Flemming). 
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said to permit the FDA to exercise scientific judgment in evaluat-
ing foqd additives. Thus, for example, the statute does not indi-
cate whether in evaluating an animal experiment the FDA should 
consider both benign and malignant tumors, or whether an addi-
tive should be considered to "induce cancer" when it is associated 
with an increase in tumors, even though carcinogenesis is thought 
to result from some predisposing condition that the additive has 
simply exacerbated. These are issues about which scientists dis-
agree and which the FDA has refrained from attempting to re-
solve by rules or administrative guidelines. Debate also often 
arises over the appropriateness of particular tests to determine 
whether a food additive induces cancer in laboratory animals.50 
Thus, although the policy of the Delaney Clause is clear, scienti-
fic judgment has played, and apparently was intended to play, 
an important role in the policy's application. 
The current debate over the Delaney Clause, however, does 
not concern its interpretation but its basic premises and poten-
tially dramatic consequences. 51 My objective is not to document 
or to defend the judgments of the FDA scientists who assess the 
50. Controversy continues to rage over the appropriateness of experiments in which 
laboratory animals are fed large doses of a substance to compensate for their short life 
span and for the relatively small number of animals that can practicably be included in 
a single experiment. Congressman James G. Martin (R.-N.C.) was extremely critical of 
the rodent studies on which the FDA relied in proposing a ban on saccharin: 
[S)accharin causes no significant increase in cancer of the test rats if they were 
fed massive overdoses of it every day from the moment of birth, and • . • no 
significant increase in bladder cancer resulted from exposure where the rat and its 
pregnant mother were fed 2 percent of their diet, that is 1 gram of saccharin per 
kilogram of body weight, daily. Thus, only with the "double whammy," of 2.5 
grams per kilogram daily for two generations, was there a significant effect. 
That does not translate into much of a risk to humans. 
123 CONG. REc. Hll,066 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1977). Mr. Martin went on to argue that 
[t]he carcinogenic effect [is] perhaps due to the action of that overdose of sac-
charin as being a physical irritant, one which would increase the raw sensitivity of 
the rat's bladder tissue. The mechanism may be a secondary effect in which this 
massive, extreme overdose would affect the rat's detoxification mechanism. Either 
way [cancer] only occurs at a near lethal overdose. 
123 CONG. REc. H 6414 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1977). See Martin Criticizes Conclusion.~ of MIT 
Study, Fooo CHEMICAL NEWS Aug. 21, at 29. 
51. In practice, the FDA has rarely relied solely on the Delaney Clause in attempting 
to ban or restrict exposure to carcinogenic food ingredients. Between the early 1950s and 
1977, the agency forbade the use of 14 food constituents on the ground that they caused 
cancer in laboratory animals. (In only three instances-those involving Flectol H, Chrona-
line, and saccharin-did it expressly invoke the Delaney Clause.) This total does not 
include more recent FDA actions dealing with chloroform and acrylonitrile. See 
Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriation.~ for 1975, pt. 8, 
Hearing,q Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriation,q, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, 
214-21 (1974). 
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carcinogenicity of food additives. For present purposes, it suffices 
to record that the agency exercises judgment in combining malig-
nant and benign tumors, and is usually unpersuaded by attempts 
to explain that an increase in tumors was not "induced" by the 
test compound.52 It routinely insists that ingredients be tested 
according to current scientific standards, but it must nevertheless 
often make decisions on the basis of studies that fall short of this 
criterion.53 On occasion it has discounted findings of carcinogenic-
ity on the ground that the test procedures were not appropriate. 54 
Ordinarily, the FDA would reject as inappropriate any test of a 
food additive administered by a route other than ingestion'. 55 
In summary, the Delaney Clause leaves the FDA room for 
scientific judgment in deciding whether its conditions are met by 
a food additive. But the clause affords no flexibility to determine 
ultimate regulatory consequences once FDA scientists determine 
that these conditions are satisfied. A food additive that has been 
found in an appropriate test to induce cancer in laboratory ani-
mals may-not be approved for-use in food for any purpose, at any 
level, regardless of any "benefits" that it might provide. And if 
an approved food additive whose benefits have become widely 
accepted is found to induce cancer in animals, the FDA must end 
its use. 58 Evidence that an additive causes other types of adverse 
52. The FDA allowed the use of the nutrient selenium in animal feed although some 
studies indicated that it is a potential carcinogen. The agency's rationale was that at 
certain dosages the additive induced in test animals a pathologic change (i.e., liver dam-
age) which in tum led to cancer. The FDA maintained that the anticancer clause did not 
preclude approving the additive for use at levels safely below the dose at which pathologic 
changes occur. 38 Fed. Reg. 10,458, 10,459-60 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 1355 (1974). 
53. 21 C.F.R. § 170.20(a) (1978) states: 
In reaching a decision on any petition filed under section 409 of the act, the Com-
missioner will give full consideration to the specific biological properties of the 
compound and the adequacy of the methods employed to demonstrate safety for 
the proposed use, and the Commissioner will be guided by the principles and 
procedures for establishing the safety of food additives stated in current publicatons 
of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council .... 
See FDA Advisory Comm. on Protocols for Safety Evaluation, Panel on Carcinogenesis 
Report on Cancer Testing in the Safety Evaluation of Food Additives and Pe.~ticides, 20 
TOXICOL. & APP. PHARMAC0L. 419 (1971). 
54. This was the basis of the FDA's recent rejection of a petition by the Health 
Research Group to revoke approval for several color additives. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,990 (1978). 
See Acrylonitrile Copolymers Used To Fabricate Beverage Containers; Final Decision, 42 
Fed. Reg. 48,528 (1977). 
55. See note 53 supra; 21 C.F.R. § 500.80(b) (1978); Color Additives: Provisional 
Regulations; Postponement of Closing Date, 42 Fed. Reg. 6992, 6994 (1977). 
56. See Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996 (1977). The Act does not specify 
how quickly the FDA must act to ban an approved additive that is later found to be 
carcinogenic. In this silence, the agency argued unsuccessfully in corre.spondence with the 
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effects, by contrast, does not automatically dictate disapproval if 
the FDA can conclude, under the general standards of the Food 
Additives Amendment, that the conditions of the additive's use 
pose no significant ·human risk. 
The reader should not conclude from this summary, however, 
that Congress has unequivocally forbidden the introduction or 
presence of carcinogens in foods. As the previous section revealed, 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act incorporates several different, 
not always consistent provisions designed to assure that foods do 
not contain harmful constituents. Some of these provisions ac-
cord dis positive weight to a finding of carcinogenicity, i.e., to a 
finding that a substance has induced cancer in laboratory ani-
mals, but others prescribe more general criteria that do not differ-
entiate between the induction of cancer and other risks to health 
and that vary in the degree to which they permit the agency to 
consider factors offsetting such risks. The result is a patchwork 
of regulatory approaches that has produced seemingly irreconcil-
able decisions respecting the use or occurrence of specific food 
constituents. 
Part ill examines the regulatory standards applicable to each 
of the several classes of food constituents recognized by the Act. 
I have used "constituent" to embrace any substance that is or 
becomes a part of food. The term does not appear in the Act, 
which, as the reader is now aware, divides food constituents into 
numerous categories-such as "food additives" or "pesticide resi-
dues"-to which special rules apply. Except when "constituent" 
is used in an undifferentiated fashion to apply to any or all of 
these categories, the Article uses the Act's terminology. 
ill. STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR REGULATING CONSTITUENTS 
OF HUMAN FooD 
As we have seen, Congress's current food safety "policy" 
must be distilled from the several overlapping provisions of the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act enacted in or since 1938. These 
various provisions focus either on the way in which constituents 
Department of Justice about the additive sodium nitrite that the ingredient's use could 
be phased out while efforts are made to find an alternative means of preventing botulism. 
See Culliton & Waterfall, Nitrites-To Ban or Not To Ban?, 1978 BRIT, MED, J. 1613; 
Smith, Ever So Cautiously, the FDA Moves Toward a Ban on Nitrites, 201 SCIENCE 887 
(1978). See also Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, March 30, 1979 (announcing the Department of Justice's rejection of this argu-
ment). It is clear, however, that § 409(c)(3)(A) precludes the FDA from allowing any use 
whatever of a new additive that is shown to induce cancer, regardless of its utility. 
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become part of food, e.g., as residues of pesticides, or on the 
functions they serve, e.g., color additives, rather than on the risks 
to health they present or the benefits they provide. Each provi-
sion addresses these two elements-if at all-largely without re-
gard to the treatment accorded other classes of food constituents. 
For purposes of discussion, constituents of food can be di-
vided into four general categories based upon their source or ori-
gin. Some of these categories in turn include subclasses of constit-
uents that are themselves subject to distinct statutory standards. 
The following sections describe and analyze the FDA's current 
interpretation of specific statutory provisions, an interpretation 
that in some instances may be disputable. Where the agency's 
position remains untested or differs from an earlier interpreta-
tion, the Article notes this fact and discusses any significant dif-
ferences. 
The four broad categories are: 
A. Natural constituents of agricultural commodities, e.g., 
ascorbic acid in oranges, nitrates in spinach. 
B. Environmental contaminants of food, which the FDA 
has characterized as "added" on the theory that they are not 
inherent even though they may in some measure be unavoidable 
in some foods, e.g., PCBs in fish, mycotoxins in or on many 
grains. 
C. Substances used intentionally as food ingredients, e.g., 
salt, saccharin, Red Dye No. 2, sodium nitrite. 
D. Substances that become constituents of human food 
through their intentional use for other purposes, which may or 
may not be food-related, e.g., food-packaging materials, animal 
drugs, and pesticides. 
This division of food constituents into discrete categories is 
potentially misleading, for some constituents fall into more than 
one category. Nitrate, for example, occurs naturally in many veg-
etables and has been intentionally added to some processed 
meats. Ascorbic acid is a natural constituent of oranges, but may 
also be added to processed foods to provide Vitamin C. Further-
more, it can be difficult to judge which category a given constitu-
ent of a specified food fits. DDT residues in fish may now be 
considered an unavoidable environmental contaminant, but their 
original occurrence can be attributed to human efforts to control 
agricultural pests. Before DDT was banned as a pesticide, toler-
ances had been established for its residues on agricultural com-
modities in accordance with section 408 of the Act, and some 
tolerances remain in effect because DDT's persistence in the envi-
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ronment makes its presence in some foods unavoidable. 
The following sections outline the current statutory criteria 
applicable to each of the four categories of food constituents and 
briefly describe the legal processes by which these criteria: are 
applied. In each instance specific attention is given to the regula-
tory significance of a finding that a constituent induces cancer in 
experimental animals. 
A. Natural Food Constituents 
Section 402{a){l) of the Act57 sets forth the safety standard 
applicable to naturally occurring food constituents. Under this 
provision a food is adulterated 
[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance 
which may render it injurious to health; but in case the substance 
is not an added substance such food shall not be considered adul-
terated under this clause if the quantity of such substance in such 
food does not ordinarily render it injurious to health . . . . as 
The legislative history of the 1938 Act, in which this language first 
appeared, does not aid its interpretation. 59 Congress evidently 
57. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976). 
58. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (emphasis added). The second clause of § 4O2(a)(l) con-
cerns the manner in which a substance becomes part of food (i.e., its natural occurrence), 
not its character. A substance is considered naturally occurring when it is an inherent 
constituent of a food marketed without processing, even though it may be identical to a 
compound synthesized in a laboratory. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food, 
39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974). Similarly, the category of food additives is not confined 
to substances synthesized by man. An apple used in making applesauce would be a food 
additive if it were not generally recognized as safe, while a synthesized chemical preserva-
tive might be so well-tested that it would be so recognized. 
59. The 1906 Act declared food adulterated "[i]f it contain any added poisonous or 
other added deleterious ingredients which may render such article injurious to health." 
Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (emphasis added). 
Most of the early bills to reform the law would have changed that language to define food 
as adulterated "[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious substance which 
may render it dangerous to health." S. 2000, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(l) (introduced 
Jan. 4, 1934); S. 2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(l) (introduced Feb. 19, 1934 and as 
revised and reported from committee, reprinted in 78 CONG. REc. 4567-73 (1934)); S. 5, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(l) (introduced Jan. 4, 1935); S. 5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 3O1(a)(l) (reported in the House May 31, 1935); S. 5, 75th Cong., 1st Seas. § ll(a)(l) 
(introduced Jan. 6, 1937). The language Congress ultimately adopted to deal specifically 
with naturally occurring adulterants appeared unexplained in a bill prepared by a sub-
committee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and reported to the 
House on August 14, 1938 as a substitute for the bill (S.5) passed by the Senate several 
months earlier. While the Commitee's report, H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 
(1938), does not indicate why this wording was added, the legislative record of the earlier 
bills may suggest an answer. 
The earliest proposed bills had deleted the word "added" from the language of the 
1906 Act to allow the FDA to regulate any food that might be dangerous, whether the 
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was aware that some foods naturally cont~in substances that, if 
consumed in excess, can be harmful, and quite clearly it wanted 
a demanding standard for FDA enforcement. The provision 
makes no specific mention of the risk of cancer, and not surpris-
ingly, there is no evidence that Cqngress anticipated that a natu-
ral food might itself cause cancer or-a more common occur-
rence-be found to contain naturally a substance that induces 
cancer when fed to laboratory animals. 
Judicial construction of the "ordinarily injurious" standard 
has been surprisingly rare. However, the few cases, as well as the 
sparse legislative history, indicate that the FDA must show that 
the amount of a naturally occurring poisonous· substance is suffi-
cient to render the food in which it occurs injurious when con-
sumed in ordinary quantities by ordinary consumers. The leading 
case, United States v. 1232 Cases of American Beauty Bra,:id 
Oysters, 60 involved an FDA seizure of oysters that contained shell 
deleterious constituent occurred naturally or was put in food by artifice. Federal Food.~. 
Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hearing on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). The bills also substituted the word "dangerous" for "injurious." 
FDA Chief Walter G. Campbell pointed out to both House and Senate committees that 
during the congressional consideration of the 1906 Act, language that would have prohib-
ited interstate transportation of any food naturally containing an "injurious" substance 
had been deleted because of concern that it would outlaw foods such as coffee and tea. 
Thus, the 1906 Act had been limited to foods containing added adulterants. But, Mr. 
Campbell explained, the 1906 Act also left such foods as poisonous mushrooms and partic-
ularly toxic varieties of West Coast mussels, which acquire their injurious properties 
naturally, beyond federal control. The word "dangerous" was therefore applied to foods 
naturally containing poisonous or deleterious substances in order to differentiate "between 
those products which may be injurious to health in a mild way and those that are unques-
tionably dangerous to health in a very definite way." Fool:ls, Drugs, and Cosmetics: Hear-
ings on H.R. 6906, H.R. 8805, H.R. 8941, and S.5 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1935); Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics: Hearings on S.5 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate on Commerce, 74th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1935). 
The final wording of§ 402(a)(l) returned to "injurious," but omitted "added" from 
the second clause-in order to reach naturally occurring poisons. Although not spelled out 
in the legislative history, the rationale of the final language may be inferred. "Injurious" 
had been the standard for all FDA enforcement actions under the 1906 Act, and Congress 
was reluctant to change language that the courts had already interpreted. But to prevent 
draconian enforcement against foods that naturally contained a deleterious substance, the 
House committee added the proviso requiring the government to prove that a substance 
was harmful when consumed in ordinary quantities. In other words, the phrase appears 
to have been another means of differentiating between "mildly" disturbing and 
"unquestionably" dangerous nonadded substances without abandoning the familiar term, 
"injurious." Statements during hearings indicate that foods such as coffee, tea, rhubarb 
(which naturally contain oxalic acid), and cocoa were not to be restricted. Congress 
wanted to reach only foods such as the poisonous mushrooms, mussels, and "Burma 
beans" that FDA witnesses had cited as examples of foods that are highly toxic in their 
natural state. 
60. 43 F. Supp. 749 (W.D. Mo. 1942). 
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fragments which the government claimed were capable of lodging 
in the esophagus or injuring the mouth. The court observed that 
section 402(a)(l) contemplates that "there may be of necessity 
food products containing deleterious substances."61 It found that 
the shell fragments could not be entirely removed, even though 
the claimant used the most modern processing t~chniques, and 
that there were no more fragments than in the products of other 
processors. That the claimant had distributed over fifty million 
cans without receiving any complaints about the presence of shell 
fragments also influenced the court. Accordingly, it concluded, 
the government had not shown the oysters to be dangerous in 
ordinary use: 
[Because] it is impossible to eliminate shell fragments in toto 
from the product, the use of oysters as a food must be entirely 
prohibited or it must be found that the presence of shell fragments 
is not a deleterious substance within the meaning of the law and 
must be tolerated[;] to reject oyster products as a food is unthink-
able. It would be as reasonable to reject fish because of the pres-
ence of bones. 82 
The court's statement assumes that notwithstanding the risk 
of choking or ot~er injury from oyster shell fragments, Congress 
would regard oysters as sufficiently important to preclude a find-
ing of adulteration. While the Act does not explicitly authorize 
such a rough weighing of risks and benefits, the court's assump-
tion is consistent with the few illustrations contained in the legis-
lative history of section 402(a)(l). The bill's proponents clearly 
did not want to ban coffee, although they acknowleged that exces-
sive consumption of caffeine could be injurious to health. Their 
desire to control the marketing of mushrooms and .mussels but 
not rhubarb suggests that the "ordinarily injurious" standard was 
meant to permit the FDA, or a district court, to weigh the relative 
dangers and importance of foods that naturally contain poisonous 
constituents. 63 
This does not mean that the FDA could not restrict the mar-
keting of a food that naturally contains a constituent shown to be 
an animal carcinogen. Given the current skepticism among scien-
61. 43 F. Supp. at 750. 
62. 43 F. Supp. at 751. 
63. See note 59 supra. In Certified Color Indus. Comm. v. Folsom, 236 F.2d 866 (2d 
Cir. 1956), the court discerned in the legislative history of § 402(a)(l) a rough balancing 
of risks and benefits. The court pointed out that in § 402(a)(l) Congress had differentiated 
between added and naturally occurring poisonous substances, precluding a finding of 
adulteration unless a naturally occurring substance was present in sufficient quantity to 
render the food injurious when ingested in the customary fashion. 
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tists about the existence of "safe" levels of any carcinogen, the 
agency could contend that any exposure poses a hazard for at 
least a small number of consumers. However, the FDA has never 
made this argument with respect to a natural constituent of food. 
The sparse case law suggests that the agency would have to dem-
onstrate a probability of harm to some significant number of 
consumers. Thus, section 402(a)(l) would appear to allow, and 
perhaps require, the FDA to consider whether a naturally occur-
ring carcinogen is present in amounts sufficient to present a seri-
ous risk. And the agency has assumed, without ever explicitly 
stating, that under 402(a)(l) its assessment of seriousness of such 
a risk may legitimately include some evaluation of the "benefits" 
of the food itself. 64 
Section 402(a)(l) is enforced primarily through seizure or 
other court action. The Act does not require the distributor of a 
commodity to seek approval of the safety of its natural constitu-
ents, nor does it provide a procedure for administratively with-
drawing permission to market a food that naturally contains an 
unsafe constituent. Theoretically, the FDA could promulgate a 
regulation declaring a particular natural constituent an adulter-
ant-as it has done with some added food constituents which had 
never been "licensed. " 65 But even in such a case, the agency 
would have to enforce its judgment through judicial action, and 
it is unclear what weight a court would accord to the agency's 
ruling. The FDA bears the burden of initiating any challenge to 
the safety of a natural constituent of food. Accordingly, the FDA's 
failure to initiate court action reflects, and probably places be-
yond executive review, its determination that a natural constitu-
ent is not present in amounts sufficient to cause harm, or that the 
importance of the food outweighs the risk.66 The Act does not 
64. There is no other satisfactory explanation for the agency's understandable silence 
on the subject of nitrates as natural constituents of many green vegetables. See generally 
Congressional Research Service, Nitrate Food Contaminaton: A Case Study (Aug. 31, 
1978) (working paper prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment). 
65. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 189 (1978). It has attempted to impose similar limitations on 
the use of specific ingredients in drugs and cosmetics. One example is chloroform, which 
the agency banned from use in cosmetics because of a finding by the National Cancer 
Institute that the substance induces cancer in laboratory animals. The agency relied on 
§ 601(a) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. 361(a) (1976), whose language parallels the first clause of 
§ 402(a)(l). In so doing, however, the agency purported to evaluate whether the risk was 
outweighed by any benefit. See Chloroform as an Ingredient of Human Drug and Cosmetic 
Products, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,842 (1976)(codified in 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.513, 700.18 (1978)). 
66. See Public Citizen v. Schmidt, [1977] FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 
1170,171.13 (D.D.C. 1976). 
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impose, and the FDA has not assumed, any responsibility to an-
nounce or document such decisions. 
B. "Unavoidable," "Added" Constituents of Food 
An important and increasingly larger group of food constitu-
ents are those that, although not inherent in agricultural com-
modities, unintentionally contaminate foods such as grains, veg-
etables, meat, milk, and fish during harvesting or production. 
Such environmental contaminants are common;_ they include 
aflatoxins on peanuts and grains, polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) in fish and milk, and mercury •in swordfish and other 
marine species. Most such contaminants are considered "poison-
ous or deleterious" because they are toxic at some level of ex-
posure. Some, such as PCBs, have been shown to be carcinogenic 
in test animals. Aflatoxins are acknowledged animal carcinogens 
and are strongly suspected of causing human cancers as well. 
The FDA characterizes these and other environmental con-
taminants as "unavoidable, "67 but it uses this term in a special 
sense. A person who wants to eat swordfish cannot avoid finite 
quantities of mercury, which apparently contaminates all of the 
species. But one could "avoid" mercury by not eating swordfish 
(or other foods) that are contaminated by it.68 The FDA's charac-
terization thus subsumes the desirability or value of some foods 
containing environmental contaminants, and measures instead 
the ability of manufacturers and processors to eliminate the 
contamination. Under the agency's interpretation, the degree to 
which such a contaminant may be "avoided" depends not only 
on the levels at which it occurs but on the practicability of the 
various methods by which contaminated food can be identified 
and prepared for distribution or consumption.89 
While the FD A's interpretation of the "unavoidability" crite-
rion of section 406 may be entirely consonant with Congress's 
expectation, its approach to environmental contaminants should 
be contrasted with the Act's treatment of direct food additives. 
67. See, e.g., Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg, 42,743 
(1974). 
68. Hutt, The Basis and Purposes of Government Regulation of Adulteration and 
Misbranding of Food, 33 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 505,533.34 (1978). See Hutt, Unre.~ofoed 
Issues in the Conflict Between Individual' Freedom and Government Control of Food 
Safety, 33 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 558, 585-87 (1978). 
69. See, e.g., Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), 42 Fed. Reg. 17,487 (1977); Aflatox-
ins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products Used as Human Foods, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,748 
(1974). 
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The FDA has prudently concluded that Congress would not ex-
pect it to ban the distribution of peanuts in order to prevent 
human exposure to aflatoxins, but the food additive provisions 
make no allowance for the fact that saccharin is currently an 
essential ingredient of low calorie soft drinks. Banning saccharin 
will effectively prevent the marketing of such products alto-
gether. Similarly, saccharin can be viewed as at least as indis~ 
pensable in the production of low calorie soft drinks as pesti-
cides are in the production of most agric~ltural commodities, the 
very circumstance for which Congress devised section 406. 
This analysis is not simply a linguistic game. The classifica-
tion of PCBs, for example, as an unavoidable environmental con-
taminant permits the FDA to avoid the strictures of the Delaney 
Clause. The agency has concluded that the Delaney Clause does 
not apply to such "unavoidable,' food contaminants for two rea-
sons.70 First, although it considers environmental contaminants 
"added" subtances within the meaning of the first clause of sec-
tion 402(a)(l),71 it acknowledges that they could not be approved 
as "food additives" because they serve no purpose in food. A food 
additive must perform a functional purpose, e.g., a preservative 
must preserve, before it can be approved.72 Second, the FDA has 
assumed that Congress did not intend section 409 to reach con-
stituents whose addition to, or presence in, food cannot be fully 
controlled by human intervention. The Food Additives Amend-
ment was designed to regulate ingredients used to make food and 
constituents, such as packaging materials, that become part of 
70. Such contaminants could fit within the Act's broad definition of"food additive," 
21 U.S.C. § 32l(s) (1976), although little in the legislative history suggests that Congress 
contemplated this result, and some evidence suggests the contrary. The House Commerce 
Committee report on the_1958 Food Additives Amendment stated that "accidental" addi-
tives were not included in the terms of the legislation. 
The principal examples of both intentional and incidental additives are sub-
stances intended for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, prepar-
ing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food. 
On the other hand, substances which may accidentally get into a food, as for 
example, paints or cleaning solutions used in food processing plants, are not covered 
by the legislation. These additives are generally referred to as "accidental addi-
tives," since these substances if properly used may not reasonably be expected to 
become a component of a food or otherwise to affect the characteristics of a food. 
If accidental additives do get into food, the provisions of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act dealing with poisonous and deleterious substances would be applica-
ble. 
H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1958). 
71. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976). 
72. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(4) (1976). See 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974). 
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food through intentional use for other purposes.73 The FDA has 
therefore regulated "unavoidable" food contaminants under 
other provisions of the Act, either section 402(a)(l) or section 
402(a)(2) augmented by section 406. As the following discussion 
indicates, the interrelation of these three provisions, enacted si-
multaneously in 1938, poses difficult problems o( interpretation. 
FDA's current construction represents an attempt to distill a uni-
fied policy out of language that defies consistent interpretation.74 
1. Section 402( a)(l) 
As was observed in Part II, section 402(a)(l) applies a more 
rigorous standard to added contaminants of food than to natu-
rally occurring poisons. The statute provides that a food is adul-
terated "[i]f it bears or contains any poisonous or deleterious 
substance which may render it injurious to health . . . .''76 The 
addition, in the next clause, of the "ordinarily injurious" stan-
dard addressed specifically to naturally occurring deleterious 
substances makes inescapable the inference that the initial clause 
applies only to added toxicants.76 " 
The "may render injurious" standard was carried over from 
the 1906 Act.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion in United 
States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 78 a case decided under 
the older law, is still the authoritative interpretation of this 
phrase. In Lexington Mill, the FDA sought to condemn flour 
which had been treated with nitrogen peroxide gas, small quanti-
ties of which remained on the food. The Supreme Court affirmed 
a lower court ruling that the jury had been erroneously instructed 
that the addition of a poisonous substance in any quantity would 
render food adulterated. The Court's opinion made clear that the 
"may render" standard applies not to the added constituent it-
73. The House Commerce Committee report on the Food Additives Amendment 
states: "The legislation covers substances which are added intentionally to food • • . 
[and] substances which may reasonably be expected to become a component of any food 
or to affect the characteristics of any food." H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. 3 
(1958). See also statement quoted in note 70 supra. 
74. See Poison or Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974). 
75. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976). 
76. There is little discussion in the 1938 legislative history about the application of 
§ 402(a)(l) to "added" substances. In its consideration of this section, Congress was 
mainly concerned about the language it should use to reach naturally occurring dangerous 
substances. See note 59 supra. 
77. Compare Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of1938, supra note 8, § 402(a)(l) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) (1976)) with Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, § 7, 
34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938). 
78. 232 U.S. 399 (1914). 
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self, but to the food that contains it; it is the food which the 
government has the burden of showing "may be injurious" to 
consumers. The Court also made clear, however, that the FDA 
need not prove conclusively that a food containing an added poi-
son would cause injury for that food to be condemned. Any signif-
icant possibility that the food would be injurious would satisfy 
the "may render" test. Consideration could be given to the var-
ious uses of the food and to the vulnerability of individuals to 
whom it might be fed, e.g., the sick, the young, or the aged. If 
food, because of an added substance, "may possibly injure the 
health of any of these," the statute is satisfied. If, on the other 
hand, "it cannot by any possibility, when the facts are reasonably 
considered, injure the health of any consumer, such [food], 
though having a small addition of poisonous or deleterious ingre-
dients, may not be condemned under the act."79 
Congress consciously sought to carry over this interpretation 
when it incorporated the first clause of section 402(a)(l) in the 
1938 Act.80 The key issue under the "may render injurious" stan-
dard is the quantity of the added substance in the food. In United 
States v. Commonwealth Brewing Corp., 81 the court acknowl-
edged that in toxicology quantity is important in determining 
whether or not a deleterious substance may be harmful and there-
fore concluded that "quantity would be the test under [section 
402(a)(l)]."82 An inquiry into level of exposure would appear to 
be essential under the "ordinarily injurious" standard as well. 
The two adulteration standards in section 402(a)(l) appear to be 
distinguished chiefly by the greater probability of harm the gov-
ernment must show to restrict a natural constituent and by its 
ability, under the "may render" standard, to take account of 
specially vulnerable segments of the population. Under either 
standard, the government must prove that the food itself proba-
bly will; or may, injure health, not merely that it contains a 
poisonous substance. If the substance is not added, it must be 
present in such quantities that the food is likely to be injurious 
under ordinary conditions of use. If any likely use of a food con-
79. 232 U.S. at 411. The Supreme Court has ruled that the language interpreted in 
Lexington Mill survived in the § 402(a)(l) test for adulteration. Flemming v. Florida 
Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153, 161 (1958). 
80. See Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 530-32 (1934). 
81. No. 7926 (D. Mass. May 22, 1945) (reported in V. KLEINFELD & C. DUNN, FEDERAL 
FooD, DRUG AND COSMETIC Acrr: JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE R.EcoRD 1938-1949, at 310, 
313 (Food Law Institute Series 1949)). 
82. V. KLEINFELD & C. DUNN, supra note 81, at 313. 
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taining an added toxicant would pose a risk of harm, the food is 
adulterated. 
Because the statute imposes a more rigorous standard for 
"added" substances, the FDA has historically interpreted that 
term broadly. In regulations published in final form in 1977, the 
agency reiterated that any substance, including natural environ-
mental contaminants such as mercury, that is not an "inherent" 
constituent of a food may be regulated as an "added" substance.83 
Furthermore, the FDA asserted, if the quantity of a constituent 
.exceeds the amount that would naturally be present, e.g., be-
cause of additional absorption from the environment, the excess 
quantity is an "added" substance under section 402(a)(l).84 Any 
substance incorporated in or added to a food, or used intention-
ally in proximity to food in a fashion that results in migration, 
would obviously also fall in this category. In short, in the agency's 
view, the first clause of section 402(a)(l) applies to most of the 
deleterious substances that may occur in human food. 
It should be emphasized that the first clause of section 
402(a)(l), like the clause applicable to naturally occurring adul-
terants, is a prohibitory standard, not a licensing provision. To 
enforce section 402(a)(l), the FDA ordinarily must locate con-
taminated food, conduct chemical analyses, find witnesses pre-
pared to testify that the amount of the contaminant is potentially 
harmful to some portion of consumers, and prove these facts in 
court. By itself, the provision gives the agency no authority to 
83. See Poisonous and Deleterious Substances in Food, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974), 
42 Fed. Reg. 52,814 (1977). The legislative history is compatible with this position. Testi-
mony during hearings on the 1938 Act indicates that any substance not "normal" or 
"natural" to a food, or that was added by "artifice" in manufacture, was considered to 
be "added." Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d 
Seas. 529-30 (1934). The courts have generally accepted this broad reading of "added." 
In United States v. 1,680,000 Pounds of White Com, No. T-4173 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1970), 
the court found aflatoxin mold on com to be an "added" substance because it is "not a 
natural constituent of com." Similarly, in United States v. An Article of Food Consisting 
of Cartons of Swordfish, 395 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court agreed with the 
FDA's contention that "the test for determining whether a substance is added is whether 
it occurs naturally in the food," citing House hearings preceding the 1938 Act to support 
this conclusion. Accordingly, the court held mercury in swordfish to be an "added" sub-
stance because it "is not naturally produced by [the] fish, but is acquired through its 
external food supply." 395 F. Supp. at 1186. Cf. United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc,, 
447 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (Although some mercury may occur naturally in 
swordfish, the substance is "added" because about two thirds of the amount present in 
swordfish is the result of pollution.) 
84. United States v. Anderson Seafoods, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (N.D. Fla. 
1978). 
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evaluate or approve the safety of a substance before it is "added" 
to food.85 
2. Section 402( a)(2)(A) and 406 
The two clauses of section 402(a)(l) theoretically provide a 
comprehensive framework for regulating food safety. Together 
they cover all substances, indigenous and added, that may render 
food unsafe, but they are inadequate in two important respects. 
First, neither clause authorizes the FDA to assess the safety of a 
constituent or of a food before consumers are exposed. Both stan'" 
dards are enforced after the fact. Second, section 402(a)(l)'s 
"may render injurious" standard does not appear to allow any 
consideration of the benefits of an added substance or of the costs 
of removing from food a substance whose occurrence producers 
cannot easily control. 
Although the legislative history is not fully illuminating, 
Congress obviously was sensitive to this second difficulty when it 
enacted the 1938 Act, for it designed two other provisions to per-
mit the FDA to establish tolerances for added poisonous or dele-
terious substances that provide some benefit-either because 
they cannot be avoided in some foods that are considered impor-
tant or because their use contributes significantly to food produc-
tion. The first, section 402(a)(2)(A), specifies that a food shall be 
deemed adultered 
' if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious 
substance . . . which is unsafe within the meaning of section 
406 .... 88 
And the second, section 406, provides: 
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except 
where such substance is required in the production thereof or can-
not be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be deemed 
to be · unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2) (A) of 
section 402(a); but when such substance is so required or cannot 
be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting 
the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary 
for the protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the 
85. It is true that in recent years the FDA has sometimes undertaken to issue regula-
tions defining a substance as an adulterant under § 402(a)(l) or announcing the quantity 
of a toxicant present in food that will trigger regulatory action under this standard-a so-
called "action level." In this fashion the agency has attempted to reduce the burden of 
demonstrating a hazard in each individual enforcement proceeding. See United States v. 
Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974). Compare United States v. Anderson Sea-
foods, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Fla. 1978). 
86. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A) (1976). 
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limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of 
the application of clause (2)(A) of section 402(a) .... In deter-
mining the quantity of such added substances to be tolerated in 
or on different articles of food the Secretary shall take into account 
the extent to which the use of such substance is required or cannot 
be avoided in the production of each such article, and the other 
ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same or other 
poisonous or deleterious substances. 87 
This language satisfies the requirements of section 402(a)(2), but 
it does not cure the problem posed by section 402(a)(l)'s prohibi-
tion of any "added" poisonous substance that "may render" food 
injurious to consumers. Congress therefore added the following 
additional caveat to section 406: 
While such a regulation is in effect limiting the quantity of any 
such substance in the case of any food, such food shall not, by 
reason of bearing or containing any added amount of such sub-
stance, be considered to be adulterated within the meaning of 
clause (1) of section 402(a).88 
As with many other provisions of the 1938 Act, section 406's 
legislative history only intimates the kinds of "added" toxicants 
Congress expected the FDA to set tolerances for. 89 Pesticides were 
obviously the primary candidates. It is questionable whether 
87. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 406, as amended 
by Food Additives Amendment of 1958, supra note 9, § 3(c) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348 
(1976)). 
88. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, supra note 8, § 406 (codified at 
21 u.s.c. § 346 (1976)). 
89. The legislative history suggests that two major concerns motivated Congress to 
modify the approach of the 1906 Act. While Congress recognized that some potentially 
deleterious ingredients in food were ubiquitous, it wanted to enhance FDA control over 
consumer exposure to poisonous substances in food from all sources. Agency officials 
complained that the 1906 Act only allowed them to consider the consequences to health 
of an added poison in a single commodity. Congress wanted to allow the FDA to include 
in its consideration the extent to which consumers were exposed to a deleterious substance 
from other sources as well. Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. 
on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-19 (1933). FDA officials also complained about the 
burden imposed on the agency whenever it attempted to enforce the 1906 Act's prohibition 
against added poisonous substances. That law required the FDA to show that the particu• 
lar lot of food subjected to the enforcement proceeding contained enough added poison to 
present a genuine risk to health. In each case the government had to summon outstanding 
toxicologists to testify that the quantity of added poison in the food was harmful-a 
cumbersome, expensive, and unpredictable process. Hearings on S. 2800 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d sess. 596 (1934). 
To remedy these drawbacks, Congress chose simply to declare a good to be adulter-
ated, and thus subject to enforcement under§ 402(a)(2), ifit contained any added poison-
ous or deleterious substance. The quantity of the substance and the extent to which the 
food might be harmful were immaterial. The agency would only have to prove that the 
substance was poisonous and that it was "added." It could then set tolerances for those 
substances that were important or unavoidable in food production. 
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Congress imagined that the FDA might, as it has done, use sec-
tion 406 to control environmental contaminants without flatly 
proscribing the marketing of contaminated foods under section 
402(a)(l).90 The point is somewhat academic, for the FDA never 
attempted to establish formal tolerances for any "added" poison 
until well into the 1970s. The agency attempted to control pesti-
cide residues on raw commodities through informal administra-
tive tolerances-levels that would cause it to initiate regulatory 
action under section 402(a)(l).91 These administrative tolerances 
were apparently known to producers and distributors of foods but 
were never published, much less made the subject of public rule-
making. 92 
90. Legislative history about which substances would qualify for the "required" or 
"unavoidable" exceptions-and thus be eligible for tolerances-is again scanty. A Senate 
Report described these exceptions by example, noting that "poisonous sprays for fruits 
and vegetables to protect them against insects or fungus diseases" might be required for 
food production and that unavoidable contaminants might be tolerated "where purifica-
tion processes cannot entirely eliminate a contaminant of raw materials, or where some 
contaminant is unavoidably introduced in factory operations." S. REP. No. 646, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935). Obviously, Congress was principally concerned about pesticide 
residues on raw agricultural commodities. Throughout the hearings and floor debates, 
representatives of apple-producing states expressed their fear that the FDA would pre-
scribe excessively stringent tolerances. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REc. 4848 (1935); 83 CONG. REc. 
7783-86, 7894-98 (1938). The FDA's Campbell made clear that pesticide residues would 
fall within the agency's tolerance-setting authority because they were required in food 
production. He asserted that many pesticides were "regarded as absolutely essential in 
the production of our supply of fruits and vegetables." Foods, Drugs, and Cosmetics: 
Hearings on S.5 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1935)(statement of Walter G. Campbell). 
Nothing in the legislative history reveals which other substances might be eligible for 
tolerances. The other examples of "added" poisonous substances that the FDA wanted 
authority to control included items that were not required for production or that good 
manufacturing practice could avoid, such as arsenic that contaminates sugar by blowing 
through open windows. Id. However, when pointedly asked whether the authority to 
establish tolerances was chiefly directed at residues of pesticide sprays, Campbell replied, 
Not at all .... They are not alone. There are a great many products in which 
added deleterious substances may be found. They are being discovered every day. 
We never know where we are going to fmd them. They may be found where least 
suspected, due, sometimes to careless manufacturing operations, such as using lead 
manufacturing equipment, and such as the deliberate addition of ethylene glycol 
to frozen eggs. • . . 
Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 
2d Seas. (1933), reprinted in C. DUNN, FEDERAL Foon, DRUG, AND COSMETIC Ac:r: A STATE-
MENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE RECORD 1251 (1938). 
91. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744, (1974). 
92. Id. On a casual reading §§ 402(a)(l) and (a)(2)(A) of the Act appear redundant. 
Section 402(a)(l) provides that an added poison will adulterate food only if present in 
quantities that may pose a risk to health. It contemplates that the FDA must estab-
lish the requisite degree of danger for any good by evidence in court. By contrast, 
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In 1954, Congress enacted section 408, which ·explicitly em-
powered the FDA to establish tolerances for pesticide residues on 
raw agricultural commodities. 93 With this amendment, section 
406 lost its importance94 until the recognition of widespread envi-
ronmental contamination of basic foods by compounds such as 
PCBs, mercury, and various mycotoxins convinced the FDA that 
it needed a statutory mechanism to control consumer exposure to 
§ 402(a)(2)(A), read in conjunction with § 406, prohibits the addition to food of any poi-
sonous substance-regardless of the quantity or the degree of risk the substance poses, 
To establish that a food is adulterated under § 402(e)(2)(A), the FDA need only prove 
that the substance is added and that it is capable of producing toxic effects. Section 406 
authorizes the FDA to relax this unequivocal prohibition for a substance that cannot be 
avoided by good manufacturing practice that is necessary to the production of a food. 
Together, these lest two provisions appear to create a system requiring FDA "licensure" 
or approval-in the form of a tolerance-for any added poison. 
It is puzzling why Congress retained the first clause of§ 402(e)(l) when in §§ 402(e) 
(2)(A) and 406 it created a more comprehensive system for regulating added food 
constituents. The legislative history of the 1938 Act does not resolve the puzzle, although 
it suggests a possible explanation for what, in retrospect, seems an oversight. Until final 
House passage, § 402(a)(l) did not differentiate between added and naturally occurring 
substances; it declared a food adulterated if it contained any poisonous or deleterious 
substance that might render it "dangerous to health." One objective of the new legislation 
was to enable the FDA to regulate foods whose natural constituents posed a risk to health, 
Since earlier versions of the bill contained a provision similar to§ 402(e)(2), which dealt 
explicitly with added substances, it would have been possible, perhaps natural, to reed 
earljer versions of§ 402(a)(l) to apply only to naturally occurring poisons. However, when 
the House added the second clause of § 402(a)(l)-esteblishing the "ordinarily inju-
rious" standard for naturally occurring poisons-it thereby implied that the first clause 
applied to added substances. 
As a result of this legislative handiwork, the FDA may in theory proceed in either of 
two ways against a food that contains an added poisonous substance-under the "may 
render injurious" standard of § 402(a)(l) or under § 402(a)(2)(A), which prohibits any 
added poison for which no tolerance has been set. The agency hes usually relied only on 
§ 402(a)(l). At first blush, it is difficult to see why the FDA would ever invoke this section, 
which appears to impose on it a heavier burden of proof. Perhaps the agency hes wanted 
to avoid having to explain why, in the face of the word "shell" in § 406, it hes not 
established a single tolerance for an unavoidable or necessary added poisonous substance, 
In addition, agency enforcement personnel may have quickly concluded, since most sei-
zures are uncontested, that making a case was as easy under §402(e)(l), and that relying 
on this provision did not call into question its administrative authority. Until the late 
1960s, the FDA relied almost exclusively on court enforcement end nev.er fully explored 
the range of administrative powers open to it. 
93. Pesticide Residues Amendment of 1954, supra note 9 (codified at 21 U.S.C, § 346a 
(1976)). 
94. Although the FDA never invoked its formal authority, § 406 theoretically re-
mained an important part of the agency's statutory armament, for § 408 did not deal with 
the problems of pesticide drift or persistence, which can contaminate foods on which no 
pesticide is used or intended to remain. Furthermore, prior to 1958, when the Food Addi-
tives Amendment was passed, without § 406 the statute would have afforded the FDA no 
basis, other than § 402(a)(l), to regulate the occurrence of pesticide residues in processed 
food at levels above the tolerance established for the raw commodity. 
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contaminated foods.95 Since the early 1970s, section 406 has pro-
vided the legal framework for FDA regulation of environmental 
contaminants and other "unavoidable" by-products of modern 
food production, such as lead in the solder used to seal tin cans. 96 
It therefore is pertinent to examine this provision's criteria. 
Most notably, section 406, which is enforced through section 
402(a)(2)(A), does not unequivocally preclude the marketing of 
food that contains an added carcinogenic substance. Indeed, the 
section does not mention or differentiate among specific risks to 
health. The FDA has taken the position that it may establish a 
tolerance for a contaminant shown to be carcinogenic-and thus 
"approve" its presence in food in quantities below the toler-
ance-if the criteria of section 406 are met.97 To be eligible for a 
section 406 tolerance, a substance must be unavoidable despite 
good manufacturing practice or "necessary in the production" of 
a food. 98 In establishing a tolerance, the FDA must by statute 
consider two criteria: (1) the level -at which consumption of the 
food will not pose a risk to public health, taking into account 
other ways in which consumers may be exposed to the substance, 
and (2) the extent to which good manufacturing ~xa-ctice can 
reduce the substance. 99 If careful processing or storage can 
achieve lower levels of a contaminant than health considerations 
might otherwise dictate, the agency presumably must establish 
any tolerance at such lower levels. 100 
Read literally, section 406 presents the FDA with an insolu-
ble dilemma. The section specifies that the agency "shall" estab-
lish a tolerance for any added poisonous substance that cannot 
be eliminated through good manufacturing practice. At the same 
95. It should be noted that § 406 does not enable the FDA to control the occurrence 
of contamination. To the extent that environmental contaminants of food are unavoid-
able, as is ~he case with mercury in swordfish, the establishment of a tolerance can have 
no effect on the levels that occur in the environment. What a § 406 tolerance does, in 
theory, is limit human exposure to the contaminant by eliminating foods containing 
higher levels from the food supply. 
96. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,744 (1974). 
97. Aflatoxins in Shelled Peanuts and Peanut Products Used as Human Foods: Pro-
posed Tolerance, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,748 (1974). See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in 
Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,745 (1974). 
98. I have previously adverted to the potential flexibility of these requirements, and 
to the FDA's solicitude for familiar constituents of the food supply. See text at notes 67-
69 supra. 
99. 21 u.s.c. § 346 (1976). 
100. Once the FDA has established a tolerance, a food containing the contaminant 
in concentrations that exceed the tolerance is unlawful without further inquiry into the 
health hazard it may pose. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2)(A), 346 (1976). 
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time it implies that no tolerance may exceed the highest level 
that poses no risk to health. However, the lowest achievable levels 
of some environmental contaminants undoubtedly exceed the 
levels that can confidently be called safe. For a contaminant, 
such as aflatoxin, that has been proved an unequivocal animal 
and probable human carcinogen, most scientists would agree that 
no level of exposure can be judged safe for all inq.ividuals. Yet 
section 406 does not appear to contemplate that, in such a cir-
cumstance, forbidding marketing of the contaminated food is an 
appropriate alternative. 
The FDA has essentially ignored this textual dilemma. The 
agency has never acknowledged that it must establish tolerances 
for all "unavoidable" contaminants of food regardless of the risks 
posed to consumer health. At the same time, it has declined to 
adopt the "no threshold" rationale for regulating carcinogenic 
contaminants of important food products, most notably peanuts 
contaminated with aflatoxin. In effect, the agency has interpreted 
section 406 as permitting consideration of the food's value, as well 
as the contaminant's toxicity and the extent to which its occur-
rence can be controlled. Such consideration is seldom explicit 
and often conducted under the guise of assessing the practi-
cability of storage or processing procedures designed to reduce 
the substance. 
A third criterion, while not explicitly sanctioned by the Act, 
is nonetheless considered by the FDA in establishing a section 406 
tolerance: the capability of analytical methods to measure the 
contaminant.101 No agency can enforce a tolerance below the level 
that practicable analyses can detect. The capability of chemical 
analysis may be a primary determinant of a tolerance for a toxic 
contaminant if, for example, the best method available is not 
sufficiently sensitive to measure levels that theoretically are 
avoidable. 102 If no method could measure the level considered 
necessary to protect public health, the agency would face having 
to establish a tolerance it could not enforce. One alternative-to 
101. Cf. Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,816 
(1977) (in establishing tolerances, the Commissioner will establish the method of detection 
to be used). See also Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, to 
J.B. Cordaro, Group Manager, Food Group, Office of Technology Assessment (Jan. 22, 
1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
102. In 1974, when the FDA first confronted the need to determine the marketability 
of PBB-contaminated foods produced in Michigan, it initially established its "action 
level" (a form of "tentative" tolerance, see note 85 supra and accompanying text) at the 
lowest level measurable by the best available analytical methods. Hearings on Polybromi-
nated Biphenyls in Lansing, Michigan (May 29, 1975) (testimony of Dr. Albert Kolbye). 
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conclude that no tolerance could be established-would be point-
less, because the FDA could not prove a violation of section 
402(a) (1) or (2) (A) if it could not detect the ostensibly "unlawful" 
contaminant. In such a case, the FDA would set the tolerance at 
the current limit of detection by the best practicable method of 
analysis. 
The Act's elaborate procedure for establishing tolerances 
under section 406 partially accounts for the FDA's failure to make 
use of this section for many years. 103 The agency must first pub-
lish a proposed tolerance and invite public comments. After eval-
uating the comments, the agency must publish a "final order" 
after which objections and requests for a formal evidentiary hear-
ing may be filed. Such a filing stays the FDA's tolerance pending 
the hearing. 10~ Following the formal administrative proceedings, 
including an administrative law judge's initial decision and any 
appeal to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, the agency issues 
an order establishing the tolerance, which is subject to review in 
the courts of appeals. 105 
Partly because of the expense and duration of that proce-
dure, the FDA has devised an informal system for setting "action 
levels" for environmental contaminants of food. An action level 
specifies the quantity of an added poisonous substance that will 
move the FDA to initiate court enforcement action against a food 
under section 402(a)(l). 106 It represents a formalized exercise of 
the agency's prosecutorial judgment, although it does not carry 
the same authoritative weight in enforcement proceedings as a 
formal 406 tolerance. 107 The FDA regulations state that the 
103. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e) (1976). See Hamilton, Rule Making on a Record by the Food 
and Drug Administration, 5Q TExAs L. REv. 1132 (1972). 
104. 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(2) (1976). A tolerance that is stayed by objections and a 
request for a hearing serves as an "action level" for FDA enforcement during the pendency 
of the hearing. See note 85 supra and accompanying text; Poisonous or Deleterious Sub-
stances: Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,818 (1977). 
105. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(0 (1976). 
106. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 109.4(b) 
(1978); Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 
39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974). 
107. For example, in the case of aflatoxin contamination of com, a United States 
district court in Georgia refused to enjoin a distributor of grain from shipping corn con-
taining a quantity of aflatoxin in excess of the FDA's informal action level of 20 parts per 
billion (ppb). United States v. Boston Farm Center, No. 77-42 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 1977), 
revd., 590 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1979). Instead of accepting the FDA's determination that 
the presence of 20 ppb aflatoxin rendered the com injurious to health, the district court 
examined the evidence and concluded that aflatoxin-contaminated com was not injurious 
to health unless the quantity of aflatoxin present exceed 100 ppb. The district court's 
ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which concluded that 
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agency will establish an action level for a contaminant, rather 
than initiate proceedings to establish a formal tolerance, when 
data on safe levels of exposure are incomplete or when the levels 
at which the contaminant occurs appear to be in flux. 108 The same 
criteria ostensibly govern the setting of action levels as apply to 
the establishing of formal 406 tolerances. 
As noted previously, for many years the FDA regulated pesti-
cide residues on raw agricultural commodities through a system 
of informal administrative tolerances which served the same 
function as the current action levels. However, because of the 
current interest in environmental contaminants and the contro-
versiality of judgments about the safety of levels of exposure and 
about the ability of food manufacturers to reduce them, 109 the 
FDA now provides an opportunity, albeit a limited one, for public 
participation in the setting of action levels. When the agency 
identifies a contaminant that should be controlled, e.g., mercury 
in fish, it announces in the Federal Register the action level at 
which it will initiate court enforcement. Simultaneously, the 
agency makes available for public examination whatever toxicity 
and human exposure data underlie its initial determination. In-
terested persons may submit comments on the exposure level 
approved, and the agency may respond to the comments if per-
suaded that the level initially announced should be revised. 110 
This procedure represents a modest advance beyond the agency's 
older practice, in which action levels were not publicly an-
nounced, but it falls short of permitting effective debate over the 
agency's judgment about safety, avoidability, and the value of 
the food. 
"the facts in this case are so one-sided that any finding of non-adulteration for amounts 
of aflatoxin between 20 ppb and 100 ppb would be clearly erroneous." 590 F.2d at 151. 
The court of appeals did not, however, rule that it was in principle inappropriate for the 
lower court to reexamine the FDA's action level. 
108. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 52,814, 52,817 
(1977); Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 
39 Fed. Reg. 42,743, 42,745 (1974). 
109. See, e.g., Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drug Admin-
istration, to Congressman William M. Brodhead (Aug. 12, 1977) (denying petition to lower 
action levels for polybrominated biphenyls) (copy on file with the Michigan l,aw Review). 
110. Poisonous or Deleterious Substances: Final Rule, 21 C.F.R. § 109.4(b) (1978). 
This procedure represents a retreat from the agency's original proposal, which would have 
provided notice-and-comment rulemaking for the establishment of action levels, with one 
important difference: any "proposed" action level would be enforced in the interim. See 
Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 39 Fed. 
Reg. 42,743, 42,746 (1974). Under the procedure finally adopted, the FDA's action levels 
will not be the product of a public proceeding, and may therefore carry less weight in court 
enforcement actions. See note 107 supra. 
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C. Intentional Ingredients of Processed Foods 
For purposes of legal analysis, this third category of food 
constituents must be divided into four subcategories which, al-
though they present similar problems of safety evaluation and 
regulatory control, are subject to different statutory treatment. 
These four subcategories are artificial statutory creations; they do 
not correspond to functional categories in the production of food. 
Furthermore, the classifications themselves reflect historical dis-
tinctions that bear no relation to either functional or safety cri-
teria. The Act's definition of "food additive," considered below, 
is illlustrative. The four subcategories are: (1) "food additives" 
used as ingredients in foods, (2) ingredients that are "generally 
recognized as safe," (3) "prior sanctioned substances" used as 
ingredients in food, and (4) "color additives." 
Popular misconception assumes that "food additives" are 
artificial substances used in food production while natural ingre-
dients, such as salt or potatoes, are simply that-ingredients. In 
fact, not every artificial substance used to make food is a food 
additive. Moreover, the Act does not distinguish between ingredi-
ents produced by chemical synthesis and those produced natu-
rally by agriculture. The definition of food additive, which ap-
pears in section 201(s) of the Act, m embraces both artificial and 
natural substances while simultaneously excluding several im-
portant classes of ingredients: 
The term "food additive" means any substance the intended use 
of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly 
or indirectly, in its becoming a component or otherwise affecting 
the characteristics of any food (including any substance intended 
for use in producing, manufacturing, packing, processing, prepar-
ing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding food; and includ-
ing any source of radiation intended for any such use), if such 
substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by 
scientific training and experience to evaluate its safety, as having 
been adequately shown through scientific procedures (or, in the 
case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through 
either scientific procedures or experience based on common use in 
food) to be safe under the conditions of its intended use; except 
that such term does not include-
(3) a color additive; or 
(4) any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval 
granted prior to the enactment of this paragraph . . . pursuant to 
111. 21 U.S.C. § 32l(s) (1976). 
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this Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act . . or the Meat 
Inspection Act of March 4, 1907. . . .112 
The subcategory of food additives thus does not include sub-
stances whose use in food is "generally recognized as safe" by 
qualified experts, a category commonly ref erred to by the acro-
nym GRAS. In addition, the definition excludes most ingredients 
that either the FDA, or, in the case of meat and poultry, the 
Department of Agriculture, had sanctioned for use in food prior 
to September 6, 1958. It also excludes color additives. Each of 
these exceptions is examined after a discussion of the require-
ments applicable to food additives. 
1. Direct food additives 
Any ingredient that is a food additive, i.e., that is not gener-
ally recognized as safe, must be the subject of an approved food 
additive regulation before it may lawfully be used in food, 113 and 
the FDA may not approve a food additive unless it meets certain 
basic criteria. Most important, the proponent of an additive must 
show that it will be safe under the conditions of its intended use. 
This requires a demonstration that, with reasonable certainty, 
the additive will not adversely affect the health of consumers. 114 
The Delaney Clause reinforces this requirement by flatly prohib-
iting the approval of a food additive that has been shown to 
induce cancer in man or, by ingestion or other appropriate tests, 
in animals.U5 
112. Id. (emphasis added). 
113. Section 402(a)(2)(C) declares a food adulterated "if it is, or it beers or contains, 
any food additive which is unsafe within the meaning of section 409." 21 U.S.C. § 32l(e) 
(2)(C) (1976). Section 409(a), 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1976), provides in relevant pert: 
A food additive shall, with respect to any particular use or intended use of such 
additives, be deemed to be unsafe for the purposes of the application of clause 
(2)(C) of section 402(a), unless-
(2) there is in effect, and it and its use or intended use are in conform• 
ity with, a regulation issued under this section prescribing the conditions 
under which such additive may be safely used. 
While such a regulation relating to a food additive is in effect, a food 
shall not, by reason of bearing or containing such as additive in accordance 
with the regulation, be considered adulterated within the meaning of clause 
(1) of section 402(a). 
114. See 21 U.S.C. f 348(c)(3)(A) (1976): See generally Freedman, Reasonable Cer-
tainty of No Harm: Reviving the Safety Standard for Food Additives, Color Additive.9, 
and Animal Drugs, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 245 (1978). 
115. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976). Neither the Delaney Clause nor any other 
provision of § 409 specifically mandates that the FDA shall withdraw approval of an 
approved additive subsequently found to induce cancer or to be otherwise unsafe, but this 
requirement seems an unmistakable inference from the provisions governing initial ap-
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A food additive must also be shown to be functional, i.e., 
capable of accomplishing its intended technical effect. 116 For ex-
ample, a preservative must preserve when used in the quantities 
intended. If this elementary criterion is satisfied, however, the 
FDA may not demand any showing of the additive's broader util-
ity or consider the availability of alternatives that would accom-
plish the same technical effect.117 The Food Additives Amend-
ment acknowledges the "benefits" many additives can provide, 
and reflects Congress's judgment that the market-not the gov-
ernment-should determine the extent to which "safe" food addi-=-
tives are used. 118 
The FDA may condition its approval to assure that use of an 
additive will be safe.119 Such conditions typically include limita-
tions on the levels of use and can include limitations on the foods 
in which or the purposes for which the additive may be used. 
Occasionally, the FDA may restrict the form in which an additive 
may be marketed, e.g., solely as a tabletop sweetener. 120 And the 
proval of food additives. The FDA has historically assumed that a clear finding of carcino-
genicity ordinarily requires prompt action to terminate approval of an additive. But see 
note 56 supra and Culliton & Waterfall, supra note 56. 
116. This standard is implicit in the requirement of§ 409(b)(2)(C) that a food addi-
tive petition contain "all relevant data bearing on the physical or other technical effect 
such additive is intended to produce." 21 U.S.C. § 348(b)(2)(C) (1976). 
117. See Saccharin And Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 20,002 (1977); Freedman, 
supra note 114, at 251. 
118. Both the House and Senate reports stated: 
The question of whether an additive produces such effect (or how much of an 
additive is required for such effect) is a factual one, and does not involve any 
judgment on the part of the Secretary of whether such effect results in any added 
"value" to the consumer of such food or enhances the marketability from a mer-
chandising point of view. 
H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958); S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 
7 (1958). 
119. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(l)(A) (1976) specifies: 
(1) The Secretary shall-
(A) by order establish a regulation (whether or not in accord with that 
proposed by the petitioner) prescribing, with respect to one or more proposed 
uses of the food additive involved, the conditions under which such additive 
may be safely used (including, but not limited to, specifications as to the 
particular food or classes of food in or on which such additive may be used, 
the maximum quantity which may be used or permitted to remain in or on 
such food, the manner in which such additive may be added to or used in or 
on such food, and any directions or other labeling or packaging requirements 
for such additive deemed necessary by him to assure the safety of such use), 
and shall notify the petitioner of such order and the reasons for such action; 
or 
(B) by order deny the petition, and shall notify the petitioner of such order 
and of the reasons for such action. 
120. Authon'ty to do so is less obvious than the authority to specify the foods to which 
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act explicitly permits the agency to prescribe labeling for the 
additive, apparently to provide information to commercial 
users.121 The FDA has on occasion, thus far without formal legal 
challenge, used this authority to prescribe labeling requirements 
for the finished foods in which an additive is used. 122 
Because section 409 requires the FDA to verify the safety of 
a food additive before it may lawfully be used, a petitioner seek-
ing approval, usually the manufacturer or a potential user, must 
submit to the agency data sufficient to support a finding of 
safety.123 The FDA has developed informal standards for the toxi-
cological tests a petitioner must submit to establish a food addi-
tive's safety .124 The type and extent of testing required are likely 
to vary with the quantities in which, and the purposes for which, 
the additive is. to be used. Although it has not always done so, the 
FDA reportedly now requires that any direct additive to be used 
at significant levels in food be tested in long-term animal feeding 
studies to determine whether it may induce cancer or other 
chronic effects. The agency also now requires testing for terato-
genic effects (birth defects) and routinely suggests, though it does 
not require, mutagenesis testing. 125 
While occasionally a petitioner may feed an additive to 
an additive may be added from the language of § 409(c)(l)(A), but has been exercised 
occasionally. See, e.g., Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995 (1977); Aspartame, 
39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (1974). The FD A's approval of aspartame, another artificial sweetner, 
has since been stayed. 40 Fed. 56,907 (1975)). 
121. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(l)(A) (1976). 
122. E.g., BHA, 21 C.F.R. § 172.ll0(c) (1978); sodium nitrite, 21 C.F.R. § 172.175(b) 
(1978); potassium iodide, 21 C.F.R. § 172.375(b) (1978); aspartame, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 
(1974). 
123. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(b) (1976). 
124. A petitioner can ascertain these standards by asking the agency's Division of 
Food and Color Additives, but they are not set forth in detail in the Code of Federal 
Regulations or any other publication. 21 C.F.R. § 170.20(a) (1978) merely states: 
In reaching a decision on any petition filed under section 409 of the act, the 
Commissioner will give full consideration to the . . . adequacy of the methods 
employed to demonstrate safety for the proposed use, and the Commissioner will 
he guided by the principles and procedures for establishing the safety of food addi-
tives stated in current publications of the National Academy of Sciences-National 
Research Council . . . . 
The regulations governing the form and content of food additive petitions are brief and 
general. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.20, .22, 171.1, .6, .7 (1978). 
125. Letter to the author from Joseph V. Rodricks, Ph.D., Assistant to the Director 
for Science Policy, Bureau of Foods, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (September 28, 
1978) [hereinafter cited as Rodricks Jetted. Some uncertainty remains about the extent 
to which the FDA routinely requires long-term testing for direct food additives, and there 
apparently have been exceptions to the generalization set forth in the text. A deficiency 
in the agency's administration of § 409 has been its failure to spell out, in regulations or 
some other formal policy statement, precisely what tests it regularly requires. 
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human volunteers126-usually to demonstrate palatability or 
functionality-the data for evaluating safety are derived almost 
exclusively from animal experiments. The critical tests are those 
designed to yield probabilistic answers to broad questions, such 
as whether an additive causes cancer. If a food additive induces 
cancer in animal tests, its use may not be approved at any level. 
If an additive's effects do not include cancer, the agency applies 
a "safety factor" to determine permissible human exposure. Ex-
cept in special cases, 127 the agency adheres to a safety factor of 
100, dividing the dose at which no adverse effects are observed in 
animals by 100 to derive a dose that will, with reasonable cer-
tainty, be safe in humans. When the agency relies exclusively on 
short-term, or acute, studies, as it frequently does in evaluating 
indirect additives to which exposure is lower, it will apply a 
higher safety factor, usually 1000.128 
The FDA would be the first to acknowledge that this process 
does not guarantee that an additive may not prove harmful to 
some individuals. Debate continues over whether experimental 
animals are suitable models for evaluating the likely effects of a 
substance in humans. In the final analysis, a 100-fold safety fac-
tor is arbitrary, justified as much by ease of use as by any theory 
of comparative biology.129 And the relatively small number of 
animals typically used in feeding studies weakens the statistical 
reliability of a finding that a ·particular dose produces no adverse 
effects.130 The FDA's determination that an additive is "safe;" 
therefore, suffers from several uncertainties. But the licensure 
process for food additives provides greater assurance of the relia-
bility of such determinations than can be ascribed to judgments 
about the safety of other food constituents, such as environmental 
contaminants, which may have undergone very little testing and 
126. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(i) (1976). 
127. In 1976, the General Accounting Office sharply criticized the FDA for allowing 
saccharin to be used at levels corresponding to 1/30 of the "no observed effect" dose in 
animals. The agency acknowledged that this allowance departed from its standard prac-
tice. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, NEED To R.EsoLVE 
SAFETY QUESTIONS ON SACCHARIN 27 (Aug. 16, 1976). 
128. 21 C.F.R. § 170.22 (1978); Rodricks letter, supra note 125. 
129. Conversation with Joseph V. Rodricks, Ph.D., Assistant to the Director for Sci-
ence Policy, Bureau of Foods, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (March 1977). 
130. Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 19,998 (1977); see Page, Chronic 
Toxicity and Carcinogenicity Guidelines, 1 J. ENVTL. PATHOLOGY & ToxtCOLOGY 161, 177-
78 (1977); Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and 
Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7 EcoLOGY L.Q. 497, 512-13 (1978) (and sources cited 
therein). 
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which the FDA must take the initiative to control. 131 
The statutorily prescribed process for approving or with-
drawing approval of a food additive is as complex as that required 
for the establishment of tolerances under section 406, 132 although 
the procedures are not identical. The FDA must announce in the 
Federal Register the filing of any petition for a food additive 
regulation-the equivalent of the petitioner's "proposal"-and 
later publish a final order of approval or disapproval. 133 If a peti-
tion is accepted for filing, the agency usually will approve the 
additive. 134 Any person adversely affected by the agency's action 
may file objections and request a formal evidentiary hearing. 135 
Under section 409, however, the FDA need not stay its order 
pending that hearing; thus, the agency's approval of an additive 
may become effective even though it has granted a hearing on its 
underlying finding of safety .136 The Commissioner's final decision 
following a hearing is subject to review in a court of appeals. 137 
Essentially the same procedure must be followed when the FDA 
131. The principal difficulty in determining the risk posed by an environmental 
contaminant of food, or any other constituent for which advance FDA approval need not 
he obtained, is the shortage of reliable safety data. No "petitioner" need seek permission 
to market swordfish containing mercury, and thus the burden of assembling data and, in 
some cases, conducting necessary additional tests falls on the government, often on the 
FDA or state agencies. Letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 
to J.B. Cordaro, Group Manager, Feed Group, Office of Technology Assessment (Jan, 22, 
1979) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Conversation with Robert S. Jackson, 
M.D., Assistant State Health Commissioner and Director, Office of Health Protection and 
Environmental Management, Virginia Department of Health (Oct. 22, 1978); Rodricks 
letter, supra note 125. 
132. See text at notes 103-06 supra; letter from Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of 
Food and Drugs, to J.B. Cordaro, Office of Technology Assessment (Jan. 22, 1979) (copy 
on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
133. 21 U.S.C. §§ 348(b)(5), (c)(l)-(2) (1976); 21 C.F.R. §§ 171.l(i)(2), .100 (1978). 
134. Conversation with Joseph V. Rodricks, Ph.D., Assistant to the Director for Sci-
ence Policy, Bureau of Foods, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (March 1977). 
135. 21 U.S.C. § 348(0 (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 171.110 (1978). The FDA has construed 
"person adversely affected" to embrace opponents of the approval of an additive which 
the Commissoner has concluded is safe, as well as manufacturers or users of additives 
whose petitions are turned down. See Aspartame, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (1974); 40 Fed. Reg, 
56,907 (1975) (staying effectiveness of aspartame regulation). Food Chemical News reports 
that "FDA-ers now believe the Board of Inquiry on Aspartame probably will not begin 
until spring and may be delayed until summer." All UAREP Document.~ on A.~partame 
To Be Submitted to FDA, Fooo CHEMICAL NEWS, Nov. 6, 1978, at 36. 
136. 21 U.S.C. § 348(e) (1976). More than a year elapsed between the FDA's initial 
approval of aspartame, 39 Fed. Reg. 27,317 (1974), and its decision to stay the effect of 
the food additive regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (1975). During that time, the successful 
petitioner was technically free to market the additive even though the agency had agreed 
to grant a formal hearing on its decision. For practical and public relations reasons, the 
firm chose not to do so. 
137. 21 u.s.c. § 348(g) (1976). 
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seeks to end use of an approved food additive, even if the agency 
invokes the Delaney Clause. 138 The Act_ provides no means for 
abbreviating this process if a petitioner or other objectors insist 
on their full procedural rights. However, the statute's elaborate 
procedure is rarely followed in full. Most food additive petitions 
are eventually approved, and in twenty years only two have pro-
voked demands for a formal hearing. 139 
2. Ingredients generally recognized as safe (GRAS) 
As noted above, the statutory definition of "food additive" 
excludes any ingredient that is 
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately 
shown through scientific procedures (or, in the case of a substance 
used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either scientific 
procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe 
under the conditions of its intended use. . . .140 
Congress limited the coverage of the Food Additives Amendment 
138. When the FDA issues a regulation on its own initiative, e.g., when the agency 
seeks to withdraw approval or ban an additive, the Act requires that at least 30 days expire 
between initial publication and issuance of a final order. 21 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1976). No 
such requirement applies to a regulation issued in response to a food additive petition. 
See Saccharin and Its Salts, 42 Fed. Reg. 19,995, 20,005 (1977). 
139. Both are petitions for the approval of the artificial sweeteners cyclamate and 
aspartame. Cyclamate was banned as an ingredient in food in 1969, following the FDA's 
receipt of evidence suggesting that it might be an animal carcinogen. The sweetener had 
not previously been regulated as a food additive, but rather was being used-with the 
FDA's concurrence-on the premise that it was GRAS. The new evidence destroyed its 
reputation as safe, thus requiring the manufacturer to obtain approval of a food additive 
petition before the sweetener could lawfully be used again. In 1973, such a petition was 
submitted, and in 1976, FDA Commissioner Alexander M. Schmidt declined to approve 
it on the ground that doubts about the sweetener's carcinogenicity had not been resolved. 
41 Fed. Reg. 43,754 (1976). The manufacturer, Abbott Laboratories, demanded and re-
ceived a formal evidentiary hearing. Its interest in pursuing the matter through the full 
administrative process was probably stimulated by the FDA's announcement in April 1977 
that it intended to ban the use of saccharin, the only artificial sweetener currently ap-
proved for use in this county. 
The second § 409 proceeding that has resulted in a request for a hearing involves 
aspartame, a new sweetener that appeared to be an alternative to both cyclamate and 
saccharin. The FDA approved the food additive petition for aspartame in 1974. 39 Fed. 
Reg. 27,317 (1974). Its approval provoked formal objections and a request for a hearing 
from an attorney associated with the consumer movement and a member of a distin-
guished medical faculty, both of whom contended that the agency had misinterpreted 
data showing that the ingredient could cause brain damage in infants and children. The 
FDA agreed that a hearing was justified, and subsequently persuaded the affected parties 
to submit the dispute to a Public Board oflnquiry, a tribunal provided by agency regula-
tions and resembling some conceptions of a "science court." 21 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.45 (1978). 
The hearing on aspartame is expected to occur sometime in 1979. 
140. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). 
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in this fashion principally to forestall ostensibly needless testing 
of ingredients, such as salt, sugar, and other familiar substances, 
which had long been used in foods without evident harmful ef-
fect.141 The GRAS exception thus represents a rough congres-
sional judgment about the priority for the FD A's evaluation of the 
safety of food ingredients. 142 
Numerous cases have construed the basic criteria for finding 
that an ingredient is GRAS. 143 As the statute itself indicates, 
there are two classes of such ingredients: (a) those currently rec-
ognized by experts as safe on the basis of their common use in 
food prior to 1958 (usage alone after 1958 cannot support general 
recognition of safety), 144 and (b) those generally recognized by 
experts as safe on the basis of toxicological tests,. whether such 
tests were conducted before or after 1958.145 Experts need not be 
unanimous in their recognition of an ingredient's safety, but there 
must be a substantial consensus. 146 The FDA will reject a claim 
141. See Food Additiues: Hearings on Bills To Amend the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Co.~metic Act with Respect to Chemical Additives in Food Before the Subcomm. on 
Health and Science of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong,, 
1st & 2d Sess. 442, 460-65 (1957-1958)(statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner of 
Food and Drugs). 
142. As the cyclamate experience demonstrates, GRAS status affords an ingredient 
no protection comparable to that provided by a "grandfather clause," which usually 
permanently exempts existing activities or marketed products from new statutory require-
ments. See Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063 (1969). 
143. Most of these decisions, it should be noted, have involved drugs intended for use 
in humans or in animals. The Act requires premarket proof of safety and effectiveness for 
any "new" human or animal drug, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360b (1976), and defines a "new 
drug" as one whose safety or effectiveness is not "generally recognized [by qualified 
experts!.'' 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(l), (w) (1976). Accordingly, many of the decisions interpret-
ing the criteria for premarket approval of drugs are relevant to interpreting the criteria 
for GRAS status. Moreover, several of the pertinent drug decisions involve drugs intended 
for use in food-producing animals, which may become components of human food. See, 
e.g., United States v. Articles of Food & Drug, Coli-Trol 80 Medicated, 372 F. Supp. 915 
(N.D. Ga. 1974), affd., 518 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 1,048,000 Capsules 
More or Less, 347 F. Supp. 768 (S.D. Tex. 1972), affd., 494 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1974), 
144. See United States v. Naremco, Inc., 553 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1977). 
145. For an ingredient to be eligible for GRAS status under this leg of the exception, 
the FDA requires essentially the same quantity and quality of scientific evidence as would 
h,e needed to support the approval of a food additive. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(b) (1978). 
146. United States v. Articles of Drug Labeled "Quick-o-ver," 274 F. Supp. 443 (D, 
Md. 1967). The FDA's regulations state, 
(a) General recognition of safety may be based only on the views of experts quali-
fied by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety of substances di-
rectly or indirectly added to food. The basis of such views may be either (1) scien-
tific procedures or (2) in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 
1958, through experience based on common use in food. General recognition of 
safety requires common knowledge about the substance throughout the scientific 
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to GRAS status that relies on toxicological tests ("scientific pro-
cedures") that have not been published in the scientific litera-
ture, where they can be evaluated by the scientific community .147 
The Act does not explicitly allow any consideration of utility 
or benefit in determining whether an ingredient is GRAS. Thus, 
the fact that salt has important preservative qualities should not 
in theory affect the determination. However, an ingredient's util-
ity is likely to influence even scientists' judgments about its 
safety if it has been used for centuries prior to 1958. In this 
connection, it should be emphasized that the conclusion that an 
ingredient is not "generally recognized as safe" does not automat-
ically preclude its use. If a petitioner can demonstrate that the 
ingredient presents no risk to consumers, it may be approved as 
a food additive under section 409(c).148 
For many ingredients, general recognition of safety is condi-
tioned upon the user's observance of specified restrictions, includ-
ing limits on levels, source, purpose, and even on the foods to 
which the ingredient may be added.149 The FDA's published list 
of selected GRAS ingredients specifies limitations that in many 
instances are -comparable to those imposed on the use of approved 
food additives. 150 However, the FDA has only occasionally at-
tempted to prescribe special labeling requirements for such an 
ingredient or for the foods in which it is used. 151 
Because GRAS ingredients do not fall within the definition 
of "food additive," they are not technically subject to the Delaney 
community knowledgeable about the safety of substances directly or indirectly 
added to food. 
21 C.F.R. § 170.30(a) (1978). 
147. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30 (b) (1978): 
General recognition of safety based upon procedures shall require the same 
quantity and quality of scientific evidence as is required to obtain approval of a food 
additive regulation for the ingredient. General recognition of safety through scien-
tific procedures shall ordinarily be based upon published studies and other data and 
information. 
148. A conclusion that an ingredient is not GRAS may, however, interrupt its use, 
for a food additive may not lawfully be used until the FDA has issued a regulation 
approving its use-a process that can require several months or longer. The FDA has 
devised a system of "interim food additive regulations" to bridge this gap where it con-
cludes that a sudden suspension of use would have unacceptable consequences. See note 
155 infra and accompanying text. 
149. 21 C.F.R. § 170.30(h) (1978). 
150. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 182.1180 (caffeine), .1440 (magnesium stearate), .1295 
(ethyl formate) (1978). 
151. See Substances Added Directly to Human Food Affirmed as Generally 
Recognized as Safe (GRAS), 21 C.F.R. § 184.l(f) (1978); see, e.g., Sorbitol, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 184.1835(e) (1978). 
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Clause. In practice, however, the Delaney principle prevents the 
introduction or continued use of an ostensibly GRAS ingredient 
that is found in appropriate tests to induce cancer in experimen-
tal animals. 152 Such a finding would undermine any basis for gen-
eral expert recognition of the ingredient's safety, and thereby 
render it a food additive requiring affirmative FDA ap-
proval-approval that the Delaney Clause would formally pre-
clude. This analysis explains the FDA's actions in the case of 
cyclamate, which before 1970 had been widely used in the belief 
that it was GRAS.153 A report by the principal manufacturer of 
cyclamate that it might be an animal carcinogen destroyed that 
status, making its continued use unlawful overnight. 154 
The cyclamate episode illustrates an important distinction 
between ingredients that are excepted from the food additive 
definition because they are GRAS and ingredients that are ex-
152. Any intentional food ingredient found to cause cancer in human.~ would be 
banned by the FDA as a matter of course, whether it was GRAS, prior sanctioned, or a 
food additive. The circumstance more likely to confront the FDA with increasing fre-
quency, however, is the discovery that a food ingredient is an animal carcinogen, as in 
the case of saccharin. 
153. 30 Fed. Reg. 15,856 (1965); Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063 
(1969). 
154. Cyclamic Acid and Its Salts, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,063 (1969). See S. Plotkin, The 
Cyclamate Ban: Science, Politics, and Law 9-11 (April 1978) (unpublished thesis). 
The conclusion suggested by the text is not dictated by the language of the statute, 
which does not specify whether the FDA can weigh the benefits of an ingredient in deter-
mining whether it is GRAS. It could be argued that by creating the GRAS exception, 
Congress recognized the utility of commonly used food ingredients, and that the agency 
should consider such utility whenever new information about the risks posed by a familiar 
ingredient comes to light. A candidate for such an analysis might be sodium nitrite, which 
is widely used in preparing cured meat products and whose benefits include preservation 
against botulism. Surely in such a case, one might argue, the FDA should be able to 
consider such benefits, i.e., seek to avoid the ostensibly greater risk of botulism, in decid-
ing whether to subject the ingredient to the rigorous standards of§ 409(c). 
No one has ever formally espoused this approach to the FDA, but it is hinted at in 
one FDA proposal, though not in a context that involved a potential carcinogen. See 
General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients, 39 Fed. Reg. 
34,194, 34,195 (1974). Its formal adoption at this late date would be very difficult to 
explain, and would effectively transform the GRAS exception into a genuine grandfather 
clause, subject to forfeiture upon the agency's finding that the benefits of an ingredient 
did not justify an exception to the requirements of § 409(c). Moreover, in determining 
whether the Delaney Clause should apply, no valid scientific basis exists for distinguishing 
between food additives, which require formal FDA approval, and GRAS ingredients. As a 
group, GRAS ingredients are less likely to be carcinogenic, simply because of their record 
of safe usage. The lack of evidence of adverse effects may also be a sufficient reason for 
assigning them a low priority for safety evaluation. But the health risks posed by a food 
constituent that is shown to induce cancer in experimental animals does not depend on 
the regulatory category into which it falls. See Hutt, Public Policy Issue.~ in Regulating 
Carcinogen.~ in Food, 33 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 541, 548-50 (1978). 
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empt because the FDA or USDA had sanctioned their use prior 
to 1958: An ingredient's general recognition as safe is always vul-
nerable to new evidence casting doubt on its safety. An ingredient 
that ceases to be GRAS automatically becomes a "food additive," 
and must be approved by the FDA for its use to be lawful.155 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not mention proce-
dures for determining whether an ingredient is GRAS: the statu-
tory definition of food additive is in a legal sense self-executing. 
Shortly after the passage of the Food Additives Amendment, the 
FDA issued, and from time to time has amended, a nonexclusive 
list of ingredients that the agency was prepared to acknowledge 
were GRAS-and which, therefore, could lawfully be used with-
out affirmative approval.158 In addition, the agency has consis-
tently acknowledged that a food manufacturer may determine for 
itself whether an ingredient it is considering using is GRAS. 157 
Should a manufacturer independently conclude that an ingredi-
ent is, he runs the risk that the FDA will disagree and initiate 
regulatory a~tion against the product, but in such an action the 
agency would have to prove in court that the ingredient was not 
GRAS.158 Neither the ingredient's absence from the FDA's list nor 
the manufacturer's failure to consult the agency in advance 
would be relevant. 
Under this loose system, numerous food ingredients have 
come into common use through the assumption by manufactur-
ers-sometimes, but by no means always, endorsed by the 
FDA-that they are GRAS. The FDA does not have a complete 
inventory of such ingredients, and it lacks reliable information 
155. The Act makes no provison for the transition between the loss of GRAS status 
and the approval as a food additive. To bridge this gap, the FDA has established proce-
dures for the issuance of interim food additive regulations. 21 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-.37 (1978). 
An interim food additive regulation may be issued for an ingredient whose safety is 
questioned by new evidence but whose continued use, pending the conduct of the studies 
necessary to resolve the issue of safety, is found to pose no significant risk to human 
health. Since controversy about its carcinogenicity arose in the early 1970s, saccharin has 
been protected by an interim food additive regulation, as have mannitol and brominated 
vegetable oil (BVO). 21 C.F.R. §§ 180.25, .30, .37 (1978). See Freedman, supra note 114, 
at 259-64. The interim regulation for BVO was attacked as beyond the agency's authority; 
and upheld, in Jacobson v. Edwards, (1971) Fooo DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 56,059.10 
(D.D.C. 1971), af/d., (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
156. Now codified at 21 C.F.R. § 182 (1978). The original list was initially proposed 
at 23 Fed. Reg. 9511, 9516 (1958). 
157. See General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food Ingredients, 41 
Fed. Reg. 53,600, 53,603-04 (1976). 
158. See United States v. Naremco, Inc., 553 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1977); United States 
v. 41 Cases, More or Less (Naremco, Inc.), 420 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1970). 
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about the extent and levels of their use. 159 To enhance its control 
over the use of GRAS ingredients and better assure their safety, 
the FDA has established a program for reviewing the available 
scientific data on all listed GRAS ingredients and has created a 
formal procedure for "affirming" the GRAS status of individual 
substances.160 
3. Ingredients previously sanctioned by USDA or FDA 
The Act's definition of food additive also expressly excludes 
any substance used in accordance with a sanction or approval 
granted prior to [the enactment of the Food Additives Amend-
ment] pursuant to this chapter, the Poultry Products Inspection 
Act161 • • • or the Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907182 • • • • 183 
This is a genuine "grandfather clause" for food ingredients that 
the FDA or the USDA had affirmatively approved before the 
159. The Acting FDA Commissioner observed in 1977 that about 2,100 direct food 
additives have been approved and went on to describe the remainder of the universe of 
food ingredients and other constituents: 
There are over 400 nonflavor GRAS substances; approximately 1,650 flavors 
and spices, some of which are GRAS and some regulated additives; about 400 
regulated direct food additives and on the order of 10,000 GRAS and regulated 
indirect additives. Additionally, there are some 65 regulated and 52 "provisionally 
listed" color additives .... 
Food Additiues: Competitiue, Regulatory, and Safety Problems: Hearings Befure the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Small Business, 95th Cong, 1st Sess., Part 1, 44, 52 (1977)(state-
ment of Sherwin Gardner) [hereinafter cited as Food Additiues Hearings]. See 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 181, 182 (1978). The agency derives its estimates of overall exposure from a variety of 
sources, including USDA records of food sales and surveys conducted by the National 
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council. 
160. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 170.30(e).35, 184 (1978). The objective of this program is 
eventually to produce a single, comprehensive list of ingredients which, based on current 
toxicological criteria, have been affirmed to be generally recognized as safe, and whose 
continued use can be subjected to the conditions specified in the agency's affirming 
regulation. It should be noted, however, that the agency's review embraces only those 
substances that appear on the published GRAS list, and that the agency has been unable 
to devise a procedure to force users of unlisted ingredients to seek review and confirmation 
of their safety. See generally Food Additiues Hearings, supra note 159 (statement of 
Sherwin Gardner, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs); Conversation with Peter 
Barton Hutt, Former Chief Counsel, United States Food and Drug Administration (Oct. 
19, 1978). 
161. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, § 2, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-469 (1976)). The date of passage of this Act, August 28, 1957, 
fell so near the September 6, 1957 enactment of the Food Additive Amendment that very 
few substances qualify for exemption under its provisions. See Nitrates and Nitrites in 
Poultry Products, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,275, 44,376 (1977). 
162. Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260 (codified in 
scattered sections of 5, 7, 16, 21, 43 U.S.C.). 
163. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(4) (1976). 
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enactment of section 409 on September 6, 1958.164 Although the 
FDA lacked formal authority to license food ingredients for gen-
eral use prior to 1958, both it and the USDA routinely answered 
requests for an opinion about the safety of individual ingredients. 
In addition, the FDA exercised premarket control over, and thus 
approved, the numerous ingredients permitted to be used in foods 
covered by standards of identity .165 The USDA had issued formal 
regulations describing permitted uses of many ingredients in 
meat and poultry products, 166 and in some instances the FDA 
formally acknowledged that the USDA had sanctioned certain 
substances for food use.167 Though a continuing source of contro-
versy, the kind of documentation needed to establish a "prior 
sanction" is principally a matter of interest for archivists, who 
can debate the significance of correspondence written or articles 
published by agency scientists in the early days of food regula-
tion.168 It need only be noted that the Food Additives Amendment 
excludes this class of previously sanctioned food ingredients, a 
class which is of uncertain size, and which enjoys a special regula-
tory status.169 
164. It is, however, a limited exception. So called "prior sanctioned" ingredients are 
excepted from the requirements for approval as food additives, but they are not exempt 
from the other food safety provisions of the Act, including § 402(a)(l). See 21 C.F.if.' 
§ 181 (1978). 
165. For a discussion of FDA food standards of identity, see generally Merrill & 
Collier, "l,ike Mother Used to Make": An Analysis of FDA Food Standards of Identity, 
74 CoLUM. L. REv. 561 (1974). In the mid-1950s, approximately 50% of the foods purchased 
by American consumers were covered by standards of identity, which were designed pri-
marily to preserve the economic quality but were also used by the FDA to restrict the use 
of potentially toxic ingredients. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ewing, 201 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1953). 
166. See, e.g., 9 C.F.R. §§ 319.300, 381.169 (1978). 
167. See, e.g., Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite and Potas-
sium Nitrate, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,456 (1972). 
168. See Gardner, Sowbelly Blues: The Links Between Bacon and Cancer, ESQUIRE, 
November 1976, at 112; Letter from Carol Foreman, Assistant Secretary for Food and 
Consumer Services, USDA, to Donald Kennedy, Commissioner of Food and Drugs (April 
22, 1977) (copy on file with the Michigan [,aw Review); Letter from Donald Kennedy to 
Carol Foreman (July 12, 1977) (copy on file with the Michigan /,aw Review). As inter-
preted by the FDA, the "prior sanction" exception requires some evidence of official 
acquiescence, but such evidence can be very informal. No USDA regulations or FDA 
opinions used the magic language "sanctioned." Prior sanctions have been based on 
actions ranging from a scientist's publication of an article acknowledging the safety of an 
ingredient, to a USDA inspector's stamp of approval on processed meat, to the USDA's 
approval of labels bearing a statement of ingredients. 
169. Because of the diverse evidence of approval accepted by the FDA, estimates of 
the number of ingredients that were sanctioned for one or more uses prior to 1958 are mere 
speculation, but persons familiar with the matter doubt the number exceeds 200. See 23 
Fed. Reg. 9511, 9516 (1958); 24 Fed. Reg. 9368, 9369 (1959). 
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An ingredient's prior sanction status does not depend upon 
a contemporary evaluation of its utility or safety, but rests solely 
on the fact of prior approval by one of the two agencies. The FDA 
has historically assumed that a prior sanctioned ingredient is 
permanently grandfathered, i.e., that it may never become a food 
additive so long as it is used for its sanctioned purpose, even if 
new evidence casts doubt on its safety .170 Since the Delaney 
Clause only applies to food additives, an ingredient that has a 
prior sanction is therefore not automatically barred from use in 
food even if it is found to be an animal carcinogen. 171 
This does not mean that the FDA cannot restrict the use of 
a prior sanctioned ingredient that new evidence demonstrates is 
unsafe. Foods containing such an ingredient are still subject to 
the Act's basic adulteration provi1;1ons. 172 But the agency must be 
able to show that the presence of the ingredient "may render" 
food injurious to health under section 402(a)(l). A finding that a 
prior sanctioned ingredient is a carcinogen would thus permit, 
but would not automatically require, the FDA to terminate its 
use.173 Furthermore, the FDA has tentatively suggested that, in 
170. See Hutt, A Regulator's Viewpoint in How SAFE Is SAFE? 116, 124 (1979). 
171. In no clear instance has the FDA continued to approve the use of a prior sanc-
tioned ingredient which has been found to induce cancer in experimental animals. The 
case most nearly on point is that of sodium nitrite, an ingredient used in the curing of 
many beef and pork products, notably including bacon. Faced with a recent finding that 
sodium nitrite causes cancer in laboratory rats, the FDA and Department of Agriculture 
are proposing to terminate all its uses but allow a phase-out period. Smith, supra note 
56. When the Department of Justice advised that the present law did not allow the FDA 
to delay banning an additive found to cause cancer, the two agencies recommended to 
Congress that legislation be enacted to permit a phased withdrawal of nitrite from food. 
See Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
(March 30, 1979). 
172. See 21 C.F.R. § 181.l(b) (1978). The exception's rationale is not difficult to 
fathom. Congress presumably knew of the FDA's practice of responding to manufacturer's 
inquiries about the safety of food ingredients, and was prepared to regard these responses 
as functional equivalents of food additive approvals. Furthermore, the special treatment 
accorded substances previously sanctioned by the USDA can be partially explained by the 
FDA's traditional deference to that department in the case of meat and poultry products, 
a deference that allowed Congress to consider such substances the USDA's concern. 
173. 21 C.F.R. § 181.5(b) (1978); Prior-Sanctioned Food Ingredients, 38 Fed. Reg. 
12,737 (1973); R. Kingham, Statutory and Administrative Theories by Which FDA Avoids 
Applying the Delaney Clause (Nov. 10, 1977)(unpublished manuscript on file with au-
thor). Cf. Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite, and Potassium 
Nitrate, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,456 (1972) (in which the FDA because of its belief that certain 
uses of nitrites suspected of posing a carcinogenic risk were prior sanctioned, did not 
propose to ban those uses). The FDA might have invoked § 402(a)(l) had it not been 
persuaded oftli'e benefits of nitrite. Nothing in the legislative history of the Food Additives 
Amendment would suggest that Congress ever contemplated the possibility that a prior 
sanctioned ingredient might be found to be carcinogenic. Indeed, Congress appears to 
Q 
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evaluating the appropriateness of regulatory action under such 
circumstances, it may consider some benefits of the ingredient's 
use. Thus, the agency once indicated that the capacity of sodium 
nitrite to prevent the growth of botulinal toxin in cured meat 
products may outweigh any risk of cancer from preformed nitro-
samines.174 This assertion is legally pertinent if sodium nitrite 
enjoys a prior USDA sanction under the Meat Inspection Act. 175 
From a scientific standpoint, however, there is no reason why 
ingredients formally sanctioned for use by the FDA or USDA 
prior to September 6, 1958, should stand on a different footing, 
vis-it-vis Delaney, than ingredients regulated as food additives or 
used on the assumption they are GRAS. Nor is there any per-
suasive theoretical basis for permitting the FDA to consider the 
countervailing benefits of one class of ingredients but not of the 
others. 
4. Color additives 
Congress enacteathe 1960 Color Additive Amendments176 to 
assure the safety of substances used to impart color to foods, 
thereby carving out yet one more category of added food constitu-
ents to which special rules apply. While the amendments also 
apply to substances used to color drugs, devices, and cosmetics, 
the following discussion exclusively concerns colors that are used 
as ingredients in food. Section 201(t)(l) of the Act defines color 
additive broadly: 
have given no thought to the possibility that some prior sanctioned ingredients might later 
prove to be harmful in any way. 
174. See Use of Sodium Nitrite, Sodium Nitrate, Potassium Nitrite, and Potassium 
Nitrate, 37 Fed. Reg. 23,456 (1972); Nitrates and Nitrites in Poultry Products, 42 Fed. 
Reg. 44,375 (1977). See also General Recognition of Safety and Prior Sanctions for Food 
Ingredients, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,194 (1974). The only example the agency cited of benefits 
that might legitimately be considered is the antibotulinal effect of sodium nitrite. 
175. In the case of a substance shown to induce cancer in laboratory animals, any 
opportunity to consider benefits of any kind depends on the substance's prior sanction, 
which shelters it against the Delaney Clause. The FDA sometimes has discovered that its 
assumptions about the legal status of an ingredient was mistaken. Assistant Secretary 
Foreman's letter to FDA Commissioner Kennedy, supra note 168, announcing· that the 
USDA has not in fact sanctioned sodium nitrite for use in poultry came as a surprise, and 
departed from that department's informal historical position. Because it then had no 
evidence that sodium nitrite itself might induce cancer, the FDA was able to devise an 
interim solution that permitted the ingredient's limited continued use pending further 
scientific studies. See Nitrates and Nitrites in Poultry Products, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,375 
(1977). However, confirmation that sodium nitrite is a carcinogen should, under the 
USDA's interpretation, automatically terminate its use in poultry products in the absence 
of congressional interference. 
176. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9. 
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The term "color additive" means a material which-
(A) is a dye, pigment, or other substance made by a process 
of synthesis or similar artifice, or extracted, isolated, or other-
wise derived, with or without intermediate or final change of 
identity, from a vegetable, animal, mineral, or other source 
and 
(B) when added or applied to a food . . . is capable (alone 
cir through reaction with other substance) of imparting color 
thereto; 
except that such term does not include any material which the 
Secretary, by regulation, determines is used (or intended to be 
used) solely for a purpose or purposes other than coloring. 177 
The FDA has adopted a regulation limiting the circumstances in 
which the concluding exception might apply: 
For a material otherwise meeting the definition of "color addi-
tive" to be exempt from section 706 of the act, on the basis that it 
is used ( or intended to be used) solely for a purpose or purposes 
other than coloring, the material must be used in a way that any 
color imparted is clearly unimportant insofar as the appearance, 
value, marketability, or consumer acceptability is concerned. (It 
is not enough to warrant exemption if conditions are such that the 
primary purpose of the material is other than to impart color.) 178 
The regulatory requirements for color additives resemble 
those for food additives, with certain important distinctions: The 
Color Additive Amendments require premarket safety testing and 
FDA approval of all substances used to color food. 179 The manu-
facturer or would-be user of a color additive may petition the 
agency for a regulation permitting the color to be used in food. 
Before it may approve, or "list," a color, the FDA must find, with 
reasonable certainty, that the additive poses no risk to human 
health, that it accomplishes its intended effect, and that its use 
will not deceive consumers. 180 The agency may impose restrictions 
on the use of a color to assure that these criteria are satisfied. 
Such restrictions may include limits on levels of use, 181 a require-
177. 21 U.S.C. § 321(t)(l) (1976). 
178. 21 C.F.R. § 70.3(g) (1978). This regulation was not designed by the FDA to 
subject food additives which impart color to regulation under the Color Additive Amend-
ments, rather than under the Food Additives Amendment, although it has that effect, 
Rather, it was adopted as part of a since-abandoned FDA scheme to subject certain 
cosmetic products to premarket clearance. See Toilet Goods Assn. v. Finch, 419 F.2d 21 
(2d Cir. 1969). 
179. A food containing a color additive that the FDA has not approved is adulterated, 
Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, §§ 102(a)(2), 103(b) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. §§ 342(c), 376(a) (1976)). 
180. 21 U.S.C. §§ 376(b)(4),(5),(6) (1976); Freedman, supra note 114, at 253. 
181. 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(7) (1916). 
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ment that the FDA certify individual batches of the color to as-
sure that the color actually used in food is identical to. the sub-
stance shown in experiments to be safe, 182 and specification of the 
foods in which a color may be used.183 The FDA has also taken 
the position that, in certain instances, it may require informative 
labeling on foods that contain a specific color additive in order 
to facilitate safe use by consumers. 184 
The Color Additive Amendments contain a Delaney Clause 
similar in language and identical in principle to the clause that 
appears in section 409.185 This clause precludes approval for food 
use of any color additive shown to induce cancer when ingested 
by experimental animals. The Color Additive Amendments do 
not recognize a category of colors "generally recognized as safe"186 
and do not exclude from the definition of color additive sub-
stances that were sanctioned or used prior to 1960. The Delaney 
Clause in section 706 thus effectively applies to all food coloring 
agents.187 Accordingly, the FDA could not engage in the kind of 
182. 21 U.S.C. § 376(c) (1976). Such a requirement.is not authorized for food addi-
tives. 
183. See 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(8) (1976). 
184. The FDA has proposed to require label declaration of FDC Yellow No. 5 when 
used to color foods and ingested drugs, and to prohibit its use in certain drugs for human 
use. This proposal springs from evidence that a substantial number of consumers are 
allergic to the color. 42 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1977). 
185. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 103(b) (codified at 21 
U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(B) (1976)), which reads in pertinent part: 
A color additive (i) shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use 
which will or may result in ingestion of all or part of such additive, if the additive 
is found by the Secretary to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if 
it is found by the Secretary, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of 
the safety of additives for use in food, to induce cancer in man or animal, and (ii) 
shall be deemed unsafe, and shall not be listed, for any use which will not result in 
ingestion of any part of such additive, if, after tests which are appropriate for the 
evaluation of the safety of additives for such use, or .after other relevant exposure 
of man or animal to such additive, it is found by the Secretary to induce cancer in· 
man or animal • . . . 
186. This statement requires qualification. Under § 103(b) of the Color Additive 
Amendments of 1960, supra note 9 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(4) (1976)), a color 
additive shall be deemed suitable and safe for use in food-and thus automatically eligible 
for listing-if the FDA has published a finding that the substance is exempt from the 
definition of food additive because it is GRAS. This provision does not, however, exempt 
any color additive from the requirement of affirmative FDA approval. 
187. The obligation to be accurate demands a further qualification. As the next 
paragraph of the text explains, the Color Additive Amendments did authorize the FDA 
to "provisionally list" colors then in use and believed to be safe, pending the completion 
of contemporary toxicological studies necessary to support full approval. As the Color 
Additive Amendments are drafted, the Delaney Clause does not.apply to provisionally 
listed colors and it would be possible, in theory, to argue that the FDA might lawfully 
authorize provisional listing-and continued use-of a carcinogenic color additive. But 
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risk-benefit analysis previously suggested for sodium nitrite as a 
preservative in meat in evaluating a specific color that had been 
shown to be an animal carcinogen.188 
While Congress did not "grandfather" food colors already in 
use in 1960, it did accord them temporary special treatment. 
Section 203 of the Color Addit~ve Amendments .authorized the 
FDA to list "provisionally" colors then in use that were believed 
to be safe, in order to allow manufacturers to conduct the kind 
of toxicological testing required to support approval under the 
new law's scientific standards. 189 The provisional list was de-
signed to permit an orderly transition from bifurcated regulation 
in which some colors were subject to little effective control, 100 to 
a scheme in which all color additives must be licensed. The only 
colors eligible for provisional listing were those in use in 1960.191 
this argument would be even more fragile in this context than in the case of a once-GRAS 
food ingredients. See text at notes 152-54 supra. The Delaney Clause clearly would pre-
clude permanent listing of such a color, and both the text and legislative history of the 
1960 amendments make clear that provisional listing was to be temporary for all colors. 
In general, a provisional listing would terminate no later than the end of the 21/2 year 
period beginning on the date of enactment. However, where necessary to complete scien• 
tific testing required for a particular additive, the Secretary could extend this period with 
respect to a particular color additive or use, if this is consistent with the protection of the 
public health and with the objective of completing these tests as soon as possible. H.R. 
REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1960) U.S. CODE CoNo. & Ao. NEWS 
2897-98. Moreover, the FDA has left no doubt that it regards evidence of carcinogenicity 
as fatal to a provisionally listed food color. Certified Color Mfrs. Assn. v. Matthews, 543 
F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Red No. 2, 41 Fed. Reg. 5823 (1976). 
188. Sodium nitrite has been used in curing poultry to stabilize or "fix" color. Once 
the USDA announced that sodium nitrite was not sanctioned for use prior to the 1958 Food 
Additives Amendment, the FDA faced the difficult task of differentiating the uses of this 
substance as a food and as a color additive, and determining the applicable statutory 
provisions for regulating its use. See 42 Fed. Reg. 44,376 (1977). 
189. Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 203. This section is not 
codified in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
190. Prior to 1960, colors derived from coal-tar dyes were subject to stringent regula-
tion under§ 406(b) of the original 1938 Act, a provision that has since been repealed. As 
the FDA ultimately interpreted this provision, which required the agency to certify coal-
tar dyes shown to be "harmless," it forbade approval of any color that produced toxic 
effects at any dosage in animal experiments-an extremely onerous standard. See Flem-
ming v. Florida Citrus Exch., 358 U.S. 153 (1958). By contrast, colors other thon those 
derived from coal-tar dyes were subject merely to the criteria of§ 402(n)(l). The Color 
Additive Amendments were designed both to relax the stringency of the "harmless" stan-
dard to permit the use of coal-tar colors shown to be safe at the levels proposed to be used, 
and to bring other colors under premarketing controls for the first time. See S. REP. No. 
795, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 1761, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 
191. This transitional authority conferred by the Color Additive Amendments was 
potentially open-ended in that Congress did not specify a finol dote by which nil pre-1960 
colors were either to be approved or terminated. Although Congress did prescribe an initial 
30-month period, Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, § 203(n)(2), it also 
permitted the FDA to extend this period by regulation when necessary to complete requi-
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Section 203 of the amendments made no provision for adding a 
new color to the provisional list to permit continued use while 
tests of its safety are being conducted. 192 
The FDA has maintained a "provisional list" of color addi-
tives for over eighteen years, deleting some colors, such as 
F.D.&C. Red No. 2, whose safety came under serious challenge,193 
and permanently listing others as scientific data confirmed their 
safety .194 In 1977 the agency publicly committed itself to a timeta-
ble for completing tests and evaluation of the nearly seventy re-
maining provisionally listed colors. 195 By the early 1980s, the FDA 
expects that no colors will be provisionally listed; all will either 
have been approved or dropped from the list. 
The statutory procedures for denying or withdrawing ap-
proval of a listed color additive parallel those applicable to food 
additives, with an important difference.196 If the FDA, after pub-
lishing a proposal and receiving comments, issues a final order 
terminating the "listing" of a color, the filing of objections accom-
panied by a request for an evidentiary hearing automatically 
stays the agency's order pending completion of the hearing.197 
Thus, the FDA may not summarily ban a permanently listed 
site testing. By contrast, in the 1958 Food Additives Amendment, Congress specified a 
two-year, nonextendable transitional period. However, the 1958 law also built into the 
food-additive definition the exception for GRAS ingredients which permitted the FDA to 
postpone definitive evaluation of many "additives" for more than 30 years. See S. REP. 
No. 2478, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. ConE CONG. & An. NEWS 5303-
08. 
192. On at least one occasion, the FDA restored a once provisionally listed color to 
the list following a brief absence. The color was FDC Red No. 4, once used by all producers 
of maraschino cherries. The agency deleted the color in 1966 following a controversial 
study that suggested it might cause teratogenic effects in dogs, but was persuaded to 
restore the color's provisional approval when cherry producers demonstrated how little of 
the substance consumers would be exposed to. In 1976, the agency once more terminated 
the provisional listing for Red No. 4 on the ground that the petitioners for its approval 
had never performed the toxicological tests necessary to resolve the earlier questions about 
its safety. 41 Fed. Reg. 41,852, 41,854 (1976). 
193. See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 5823 (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 81.10(0 (1978). 
194. E.g., Ferric Ferrocyanide (Iron Blue), 43 Fed. Reg. 54,235 (1978). 
195. See Color Additives: Provisional Regulations; Postponement of Closing Dates, 
42 Fed. Reg. 6992 (1977). 
196. See 21 U.S.C. § 376(b), (c), {e) (1976). The Color Additive Amendments contain 
another distinctive feature. This is a provision, 21 U.S.C. § 376(b){5){C), {D) {1976), that 
allows the petitioner for a color whose potential carcinogenicity is in issue to request that 
the matter be referred to a special committee selected by the National Academy of Sci-
ences. No similar provision is made for resolving the scientific issues involving other 
constituents of food, with the exception of pesticide residues on raw agriculture commodi-
ties. The authority to refer a color additive to an N.A.S. committee has never formally 
been invoked. 
197. 21 U.S.C. § 371{e){2) {1976). 
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color even upon a finding of carcinogenicity or some more acute 
hazard. By contrast, the agency can suspend, without even pub-
lishing a proposal or seeking comments, the use of a provisionally 
listed color whose safety comes into question. 198 
D. Indirect Constituents of Food 
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act separately recognizes 
three other categories of added food constituents that are not 
intended ingredients but become components of food through 
their intended use in food production, processing, or distribution. 
The three classes are: (1) so-called "indirect" or "incidental" food 
additives, such as packaging materials that migrate to food; (2) 
animal drugs that can leave residues in tissues (meat, milk, or 
eggs) consumed as human food; and (3) pesticide residues on raw 
agricultural commodities and in processed foods. 199 The levels at 
which these indirect constituents occur typically are much lower 
than the levels at which most intended ingredients are used. The 
first two categories are subject to some version of the Delaney 
Clause. The statutory standards for tolerances for pesticide resi-
dues, however, do not accord decisive weight to a finding that a 
pesticide induces cancer. 
l. Indirect food additives 
As many as 10,000 substances200 are used in proximity with 
food-in food packaging, in equipment used to process or store 
food, in compounds used to clean such equipment-in ways that 
permit small amounts to migrate to and become a part of the 
food. Such constituents of food are ordinarily not "unavoidable" 
in the sense that mercury contamination of swordfish is unavoid-
198. See Certified Color Mfrs. Assn. v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 284 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
199. The FDA estimates that there may be as many as 10,000 indirect food additives 
(including indirect GRAS and prior sanctioned substances). Food Additives Hearings, 
supra note 159, at 57 . .AB of September 1978, the EPA had set tolerances for the residues 
of 268 pesticides on one or more raw agricultural commodities. Of the total of 5,984 
individual EPA tolerances, 940 are for chemicals suspected of causing cancer. SUBCOMM. 
ON OVERSIGHT AND INVEsTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON lNTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM• 
MERCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESs. CANCER-CAUSING CHEMICALS IN FooD 33 (Comm. Print 1978), 
At least 143 pesticides and animal drugs are known to leave chemical residues in meet 
and poultry, but the USDA monitors only 46 of these substances occurring in edible 
animal tissue. Id. at 24. In this context, "pesticide residues" include only pesticides 
purposely used on crops for which they are approved, and not residues that may find their 
way into the food supply through drift to other crops or persistence in the environment. 
200. Food Additives Hearings, supra note 159, at 57 (statement of Sherwin Gardner, 
Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs). 
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able. Apparently, swordfish that contain no measurable amounts 
of mercury cannot be found, but most foods can either be pack-
aged in materials that do not migrate in detectable amounts or 
can be marketed without packaging. Avoidance of the contami-
nant in the latter case does not require giving up the food. 
The full requirements of the Food Additives Amendment 
apply to substances that migrate to food from food-contact sur-
faces. Section 201(s) of the Act defines a food additive as 
any substance the intended use of which results or may reasonably 
be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its becoming a 
component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food 
(including any substance intended for use in producing, manufac-
turing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, trans-
porting, or holding food).201 
A migrating food contact material" can escape the food addi-
tive classification if it is generally recognized as safe or if it is the 
subject of a prior sanction, and some established packaging mate-
rials fall within these exceptions.202 The procedures for obtaining, 
or withdrawing, FDA approval are identical for indirect and di-
rect food additives, and the basic statutory criteria for approval 
are the same. Accordingly, an indirect food additive must be 
shown, with reasonable certainty, to be safe, and no weight may 
be accorded the economic benefits of its use. Similarly, the Dela-
ney Clause squarely applies to indirect food additives and prohib-
its the use, in applications likely to result in migration to food, 
of any substance shown to induce cancer in experimental ani-
mals. While application of the Delaney Clause to direct ingredi-
ents and animal drugs has proved controversial, its expanding 
application to indirect food additives is likely to prove the most 
disruptive. 
Most materials used in packaging and other food-contact 
applications would never be considered for use as food ingredients 
because their chemical structure, or experimental evidence, sug-
gests they are probably toxic. This is clearly true for the many 
varieties of packaging materials synthesized from hydrocarbon 
sources. Furthermore, rapid improvements in chemical analysis 
201. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976) (emphasis added). 
202. For example, although acrylonitrile polymers in beverage containers are classi-
fied as food additives, some meat product wrappings made from acrylonitrile copolymers 
have a prior sanction and thus are not classified as food additives. 21 C.F.R. § 181.32 
(1978). Some other packaging materials, such as sorbose and acacia, are generally recog-
nized as safe and thus are not subject to regulation as food additives. See 21 C.F.R. 
§ § 186.1330 (acacia), .1839 (sorbose) (1978). 
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have permitted scientists to measure increasingly small quanti-
ties of substances migrating from food contact applications.203 
This development has made it possible to detect traces in food of 
packaging materials that once were thought incapable of migra-
tion. Improvements in analytical chemistry thus irresistibly en-
large the category of compounds that are potel\tial food addi-
tives-and are subject to the Delaney Clause.204 
A recent decision of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, if 
upheld on judicial review, may accelerate this development.205 
The decision affects the use206 of acrylonitrile copolymers to man-
ufacture beverage containers. The FDA initiated proceedings to 
revoke existing food additive regulations for four such containers, 
because of (1) evidence that residual acrylonitrile monomer is 
likely to migrate into the beverages at levels higher than antici-
pated, and (2) recent experimental data that raise serious ques-
tions about the material's safety. 201 The manufacturers contended 
that improved fabrication methods would produce a bottle con-
taining so little residual acrylonitrile monomer that no migration 
could be detected. The Commissioner rejected this contention as 
unpersuasive. He ruled that a material in packaging can be pre-
203. In 1958, 50 parts per million was the smallest amount of material detectable. 
Today, analytical chemistry can detect parts per trillion. See Lyons, Up-to-Date Technol-
ogy, Out-of-Date Regulations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1978, at§ 4 at 6E, col. 1. For a more 
detailed discussion of the improvements in analytical chemistry in recent decades, see 
Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for Evaluat-
ing Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,069, 17,075-77 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Assays for Carcinogenic Residues]. 
204. While the statutory definition of "food additive" does not on its face require 
evidence of actual migration, it might be difficult for the FDA to explain why a substance 
that had been detected in food, even though at very low levels, was not potentially a food 
-additive. The FDA is reportedly exploring ways of limiting its obligation to search for 
minute migrants by establishing criteria for detection methods similar to those it promul-
gated for animal drugs. See notes 237-50 infra and accompanying text. 
205. Acrylonitrile Copolymers Used to Fabricate Beverage Containers: Final Deci-
sion, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,528 (1977). Petitions for review of the Commissioner's decision were 
later filed in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where argument 
was heard earlier this year. Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, No. 77-2023 and consolidated cases 
Nos. 77-2024, 77-2026, and 77-2032 (March 15, 1979). 
206. Acrylonitrile copolymers had received informal FDA approval for use in some 
food contact applications as early as 1948. Acrylonitrile Copolymers Intended for Use in 
Contact with Food, 41 Fed. Reg. 23,940, 23,941 (1976). 
In 1976, the agency amended the existing interim food additive regulation, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 121.2010 (1976) (recodified at § 180.22 (1978)), to allow the use of acrylonitrile copoly-
mers to fabricate containers for nonalcoholic beverages. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,940 (1976). The 
history of the FD A's handling of acrylonitrile is recounted in the agency's 1976 amendment 
and in the Commissioner's decision, supra note 205. 
207. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,528 (1977). 
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sumed "to become a component of food," within the -meaning of 
section 201(s), even though available methods of analysis cannot 
detect migration, if evidence demonstrates that the material can 
diffuse into packaged food. 208 This presumption may be defeated 
only if the petitioner can prove that diffusion does not occur when 
the packaging contains lower residual levels of the material.209 
The Delaney Clause will increasingly be implicated in regu-
latory decisions involving indirect additives because many chem-
icals used in the manufacture of food contact materials are sus-
pected or unequivocal carcinogens. Realization of this fact is 
partly a result of accumulating evidence of the effects of in-
dustrial exposure, as in the case of workers engaged in the manu-
facture of vinyl chloride and acrylonitrile.210 It also results from 
demands stimulated by other regulatory agencies, notably the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration211 and the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, for toxicological evaluation of in-
dustrial chemicals.212 
Scientific developments on two fronts are therefore likely to 
precipitate application of the Delaney Clause to compounds 
whose presence in food could not have been predicted, much less 
detected, only a few years ago. Enforcement of the Food Additives 
Amendment in this context may produce unexpected results. 
208. The evidence that the Commissioner relied on consisted of tests conducted on 
older containers that had higher concentrations of acrylonitrile monomer, which was 
shown to migrate at low levels into beverages and food-simulating solvents. The Commis-
sioner stated that, although the concentration of acrylonitrile monomer in the newer 
bottles had been reduced, the observation of migration in the older containers made it 
reasonable to expect some migration from the newer containers as well. Id. at 48,530. 
209. See id. at 48,530-31. Some readers of the Commissioner's decision were initially 
skeptical that such a showing could ever be made. Reportedly, however, manufacturers 
of polyvinyl chloride another plastic packaging material of considerable commercial im-
portance and a frank carcinogen in man as well as laboratory animals, have preliminarily 
persuaded the FDA's Bureau of Foods that they have devised a method of manufacture 
that prevents migration of residual vinyl chloride monomer. The method reduces the 
residual monomer to the lowest achievable levels during synthesis, and vacuum-strips the 
material to eliminate all remaining monomer to a level below the capability of chemical 
analysis. In addition, the manufacturers have proferred plausible support for a theory 
that, at very low levels, the residual monomer is bound within the plastic and unable to 
migrate. See 20 Fooo CHEMICAL NEWS, October 9, 1978, at 7. 
210. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,762 (1978); Stan-
dard for Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974). 
211. See Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a 
Potential Occupational Carcinogenic Risk, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977). 
212. S~e Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens: 
Interim Guidelines and Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976); Pesticide Programs: Regis-
tration, Reregistration, and Classification Procedures, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,242 (1975). See also 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (Supp. 1979). 
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Unlike most intentional ingredients, these "new" food additives, 
such as acrylonitrile, are found (if at all) only at very low parts-
per-billion in packaged food. But the Delaney Clause flatly for-
bids use of a carcinogenic material for food packaging if it is likely 
to migrate to food in any quantity,213 and the clause could reach 
other, more remote, uses of the material, such as conveyor belts 
and water pipes made from vinyl chloride. 214 Furthermore, section 
409 does not allow any showing of an additive's special utility to 
overcome a finding of carcinogenicity. The law appears to make 
no allowance for the fact that the risk posed by migrating quanti-
ties of food packaging material, while not negligible, is likely to 
be considerably less than that posed by most direct food addi-
tives, which are used at much higher levels. 215 
213. The legislative history of the Food Additives Aniendment does not reveal 
whether Congress fully appreciated the potential interaction between the expansive defi-
nition of "food additive" and the Delaney Clause. The House Report discusses both 
"intentional" and "incidental" additives together and lists examples considered illustra-
tive of goth ca~.These include "substances intended for use in producing, manufac-
turing, packing, processing, preparing, treating, packaging, transporting, or holding 
food." H.R. REP. No. 2284, 85th Cong., 2d Seas. 3 (1958). Congressman Delaney explained 
that one event which had prompted him to introduce his amendment was the use of a 
pesticide chemical known to induce cancer, 104 CONG. REc. 17,420 (1958), but he failed 
to note that pesticide residues fall outside the coverage of § 409 and, thus, beyond the 
reach of the Clause that bears his name. While some members questioned the wisdom of 
Delaney's proposed definition, none cited cases in which its application would be unsound. 
104 CONG. REc. at 17,421-22. 
The Senate Report indicates that incidental food additives were to be subject to the 
Delaney Clause, just as direct additives, and went on to observe, 
[W]e want the record to show that in our opinion the bill is aimed at preventing 
the addition to the food our people eat of any substances the ingestion of which 
reasonable people would expect to produce not just cancer but any disease or dis-
ability. In short, we believe the bill reads and means the same with or without 
the inclusion of the [Delaney Clause]. This is also the view of the Food and Drug 
Administration. 
S. REP. No. 2422, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958). 
Although not technically a part of the formal legislative history of the Food Additives 
Amendment, the original report of the Delaney Committee provides examples of the type 
of compounds the proponents of the clause hoped to reach. The report alluded to the 
problem of indirect chemical additives, citing antibiotics which were used to treat dairy 
cattle and which subsequently appeared in milk products. The report also stated that the 
problem extended beyond pesticides and chemical additives, and included paper, fiber, 
and plastics used as food containers, wrappers, and handling equipment. H.R. REP. No. 
2356, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1952). 
214. For a revealing discussion of the FDA's current position on polyvinyl chloride 
water pipes, see Vinyl Chloride Polymers In Contact with Food, 40 Fed. Reg. 40,529, 
40,534-35 (1975). See also Doniger, supra note 130. 
215. The FDA has banned the use of acrylonitrile bottles, which yield a concentration 
ofacrylonitrile in the bottled beverage ofless than 10 parts per billion (ppb). 42 Fed. Reg. 
45,828, 45,829 (1977). In contrast, saccharin, a direct food additive, is used in concentra-
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2. Animal drug residues 
Compounds administered to food-producing animals as 
drugs or feed supplements compose a second category of indirect 
constituents of human food, for they may leave residues in meat, 
milk, or eggs. Animal drugs and animal feed additives are both 
subject to the Delaney Clause, b~t with an important qualifica-
tion created by a special amendment to the clause passed by 
Congress in 1962. Before examining this qualification, a brief 
summary of the regulatory framework for animal drugs and feed 
additives is in order. 
Compounds added to animal feed are subject to the Food 
Additives Amendment of 1958 on the same terms as intentional 
ingredients of human food; the Act's definition of "food" specifi-
cally embraces "articles used for food or drink for man or other 
animals. "216 
Accordingly, a substance added to animal feed must be gen-
erally recognized as safe, be used in· accordance with a prior sanc-
tion issued by the FDA or the USDA, or be the subject of an 
approved food additive regulation. The procedures for approval 
of animal feed additives generally do not differ from those appli-
cable to ingredients of human food. 217 The central inquiry is 
usually whether the ingredient will be safe for the animals to 
which it will be fed. However, the FDA has not undertaken a 
formal review of the safety of animal feed, nor has it established 
any system for affirming the general recognition of specific ingre-
dients as safe.218 
Prior to the passage of the Animal Drug Amendments of 
tions of approximately 400 parts per million (12 milligrams per fluid ounce). See 21 C.F .R. 
§ 180.37(d)(l) (1978). 
The FDA is currently considering ways of escaping from this dilemma. One possibility 
under discussion would be to establish a level of migration below which § 409 would not 
apply, a level so low that the risk posed by any migrating material could be ignored. As 
the next section explains, the FDA has devised a similar approach for dealing with resi-
dues of carcinogenic animal drugs. The dist_inctive feature of that approach is that the 
residue level which the agency would ignore, i.e., allow to go uncontrolled, is keyed to the 
carcinogenic potency of the compound. This feature can more readily be reconciled with 
the text of the statute governing animal drugs. See notes 237-59 infra, and accompanying 
text. It remains to be seen whether under the present statute FDA could justify a similar 
approach to indirect food additives, which are regulated under a provision of the Act that 
appears to speak in terms of the occurrence, or likely occurrence, of physical migration. 
See § 201(s) of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). 
216. 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (1976). The definition of food additive in § 201(s) does not 
differentiate between food for humans and food for animals. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). 
217. See notes 132-39 supra and accompanying text. 
218. See text at note 160 supra. 
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1968, 219 animal drugs were potentially subject to the general re-
quirements of section 505, which was applicable to all new drugs, 
veterinary as well as human.220 That section, from 1962 on, re-
quired that a new animal drug be proved effective as well as safe 
for the animals to which it would be administered.221 Further-
more, a drug to be used in food-producing animals in a fashion 
that could leave residues in the edible tissues had to meet the 
food safety requirements of the Food Additives Amendment. 222 
The 1968 amendments established a consolidated licensure pro-
cedure, but did not alter the substantive standards applicable to 
animal drugs that may contaminate human food. 223 
The standards applicable to drugs used in food-producing 
animals thus require the FDA to balance the risks and benefits 
of a drug for the animals and to verify the safety vel non of any 
residues that might occur in food. For an animal feed additive, 
the agency must evaluate the safety of the compound under the 
criteria of section 409, including the Delaney Clause. As they 
apply to animal drugs and feed additives, however, the criteria 
were significantly changed in 1962. Following the passage of the 
Food Additives Amendment in 1958, the FDA concluded that no 
compound found to induce cancer in laboratory animals could be 
approved for use as an additive to animal feed, on the unexcep-
tionable ground that the Delaney Clause prohibited the approval 
· of any carcinogenic "food additive." This interpretation pre-
cluded the marketing of a number of compounds that promised 
significant savings in the cost of producing livestock. Moreover, 
it preserved a monopoly for manufacturers of implantable dosage 
forms of such compounds, which could escape the food additives 
law if the FDA concluded that they could not "reasonably be 
expected to become a component offood."224 The notable example 
219. Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, supra note 9. 
220. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976). 
221. A "new animal drug" is one that is not generally recognized as safe and effective 
for its intended uses. 21 U.S.C. § 32l(w) (1976). See U.S.C. § 32l(p) (1976) (parallel 
definition of "new drug" for humans). Congress thus excluded from the requirement for 
premarket approval drugs-human as well as animal-that already enjoyed a reputation 
among scientific experts as safe and effective. As a practical matter, however, virtually 
all new chemical entities introduced since 1962 have been subjected to the premarket 
approval process. 
222. This result followed from the Act's definition of food additive, which includes 
any substance whose intended use "results or may reasonably be expected to result, 
directly or indirectly, in its becoming a component ..• of any food." 21 U.S.C. § 32l(s) 
(1976). 
223. See S. REP. No. 1308, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968). 
224. This interpretation, which could hardly be said to fly in the face of the statutory 
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was diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic estrogen believed to be 
an animal carcinogen. As part of the Drug Amendments of 1962, 225 
Congress addressed these problems by adding the following, qual-
ifying language to the flat prohibition of the Delaney Clause: 
{T]his proviso shall not apply with respect to the use of a sub-
stance as an ingredient of feed for animals which are raised for food 
production, if the Secretary finds (i) that, under the conditions of 
use and feeding specified in proposed labeling and reasonably cer-
tain to be followed in practice, such additive will not adversely 
affect the animals for which such feed is intended, and (ii) that no 
residue of the additive will be found (by methods of examination 
prescribed or approved by the Secretary by regulations . . .) in 
any edible portion of such animal after slaughter or in any food 
yielded by or derived from the livtng animal . . . . 226 
Known as the "DES proviso," this language requires the 
FDA to prescribe analytical methods for measuring residues of a 
carcinogenic drug or feed additive in animal tissues (meat, milk, 
and eggs) used for human food. This amended version of the 
Delaney Clause is implemented through the procedures for licens-
ing animal feed additives and new animal drugs. m Under current 
FDA practice, the manufacturer of a new animal drug or animal 
feed additive that might be a carcinogen must conduct chronic 
toxicity tests of the compound (and selected metabolites) to de-
termine whether the Delaney Clause applies to the product. If the 
drug is found to induce cancer,228 the manufacturer must submit 
chemical analytical and confirmatory methods adequate to de-
tect unlawful residues. 
The formal administrative process for the approval of new 
language, also aggravated other competitive inequities. Some producers of additives to 
animal feed had obtained informal FDA approval for their products in the mid-1950s. 
These approvals, in the agency's view, constituted "prior sanctions" within the meaning 
of§ 201(s), 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). Thus, some manufacturers were able to market feed 
supplements that promoted growth while others were stifled by the FDA's interpretation 
of the new law. Address by Richard Kingham, Course on Food and Drug Law for FDA 
Scientists, at University of Virginia School of Law (August 18, 1978). 
225. Drug Amendments of 1962, § 104(f)(l), Pub. L. No. 87-781, §104(f)(l), 76 Stat. 
785 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1976)) H.R. REP. No. 2464, 87th Cong., 
2d Sess. 5 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1962) (Conference Report). 
226. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1976) (emphasis added). Essentially identical 
language was incorporated in the Color Additive Amendments of 1960, supra note 9, and 
was later included in the provisions that Congress enacted in 1968 to govern approval of 
new animal drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 301b (d)(l)(H) (1976). 
227. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 348, 360b (1976); Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 
203, at 17,069. 
228. Perez, Human Safety Data Collection and Evaluation for the Approval of New 
Animal Drugs, 3 J. TOXICOLOGY & ENVT. HEALTH, 837, 852-53 (1977). 
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animal drugs resembles that for human food and animal feed 
additives, with comparable opportunities for a formal evidentiary 
hearing on ·any denial of approval and for judicial review. Essen-
tially the same procedures must be followed if the FDA wishes to 
withdraw approval of a compound on the ground that it fails to 
meet the requirements of the modified Delaney Clause or is other-
wise unsafe for humans. 229 
Before approving a new animal drug, the FDA must deter-
mine that the drug is effective for its intended uses in target 
animals (including, if pertinent, growth promotion), that it will 
be safe for the animals, and, if the animals are sources of human 
food, that any residues will, with reasonable certainty, be safe for 
human consumption.230 In applying the first two criteria, the 
agency makes a rough risk-benefit analysis of the kind it conducts 
in evaluating drugs for human use. The third criterion, however, 
embodies the basic safety standard of the Food Additives Amend-
ment, which, in the agency's view, does not permit balancing any 
risk to human health against benefits to animal husbandry or 
food production.231 In substance, the drug residue is treated sim-
229. There is a notable distinction between the statutory procedures applicable to 
new animal drugs and those applicable to animal feed additives. Under § 612, the FDA 
may not withdraw the approval of a drug without first according the manufacturer an 
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing unless the Secretary of HEW personally determines 
that the drug poses an "imminent hazard" to human health. See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e) 
(1976). Until very recently, the FDA had construed "imminent hazard" to include only 
situations in which the risk of injury is both serioUB and immediate. Thus, the cancer 
hazard associated with smoking cigarettes would not constitute an "imminent hazard" 
becaUBe of the lengthy latency of the illness, coupled with its close association with 
prolonged exposure. The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Commerce Committee has severely criticized this narrow definition, contending that 
"imminent hazard" referred to the potential serioUBness of injury and had little to do with 
the length of time necessary for its occurrence or its likelihood. StracoMM. ON OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON lNn:RSTATE AND FOREIGN C0!',1MERCE, 94TH 
CONG., 2D SESs. FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULA.TORY REFORM 293-96 (Comm. Print 1976), 
The same imminent-hazard standard applies to human drugs. The Secretary of HEW 
has only invoked this standard once. See Phenformin: Public Hearing, 42 Fed. Reg. 21,846 
(1977). This proposed ruling, involving a drug in-wide use for the treatment of diabetes, 
may well liberalize the FDA's historical interpretation of the "imminent hazard" lan-
guage. Without the involvement of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare the 
FDA could make the withdrawal of a food or feed additive regulation effective pending a 
hearing simply by refusing to stay its action, even if objections requiring a formal eviden-
tiary hearing were submitted. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(e) (1976). 
230. See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d) (1976). 
231. The decision in Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia Inc. v. FDA, 496 F.2d 976 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), suggests a contrary conclusion. However, the court's dictum fails to distinguish 
between the criteria applicable to human drugs and those applicable to animal drugs, 
which in effect incorporate the "no benefit" formula of the Food Additives Amendment. 
See Freedman, supra note 114, at 268-70. Moreover, the court's implication would anorna-
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ply as another type of indirect food additive. Accordingly, if an 
animal drug would leave unsafe residues in food, the FDA would 
not approve it even if its use might lower production costs, reduce 
meat prices, or control animal disease. The agency has never 
seriously considered requiring that meat derived from treated 
animals be labeled to alert consumers to the potential risks from 
drug residues.232 Moreover, most meat and many poultry products 
are packaged at the point of sale, which would make it difficult 
to enforce such a labeling requirement comprehensively. 
The Act does not accord special treatment based upon their 
prior use to residue-producing animal drugs, as it does for certain 
classes of intentional ingredients of human food or animal feed. 233 
The law does not require premarketing approval of animal drugs 
that are generally recognized as safe and effective, 234 and it does 
"grandfather" certain products marketed prior to 1938 or 1962. 235 
As a practical matter, however, neither escape route is available 
to most currently marketed animal drugs that are capable of 
leaving residues in human food, nor would either be open to any 
new product. Accordingly, the modified Delaney Clause can be 
lously permit the FDA to consider the· benefits of human food "additives" administered 
to food-producing animals in the form of drugs but not the benefits of constituents re-
sulting from the use of additives in the feed of such animals, which remain regulated under 
§ 409. 
232. The FDA probably could assert authority over the labeling of retail packages of 
meat and poultry products, although the agency has historically deferred to USDA regula-
tion in this area. The practical difficulties posed by the jurisdictional overlap aside, the 
FDA has found in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authority for comparable labeling 
requirements for other products. For example, the FDA has required manufacturers of hair 
dyes containing coal-tar dyes to include a warning that the product contains an ingredient 
that can penetrate the skin and which causes cancer in laboratory animals. Coal Tar Hair 
Dyes Containing 4-Methoxyl-M-Phenylenediamine or 4-Methoxy-M-Phenylenediamine 
Sulfate, 43 Fed. Reg. 1101 (1978). The authority of the FDA to require warnings about 
ingredients has been upheld by the District Court for the District of Columbia. Cosmetic, 
Toiletry & Fragrance Assn. v. Schmidt, 409 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976). Although in that 
case the agency relied on the "false or misleading" provison applicable to cosmetics, an 
identical provision applies to food. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1976) with 21 U.S.C. 
§ 343(a)(l) (1976). For a discussion of the overlap between FDA and USDA jurisdiction 
over labeling of meat and poultry products, see 5 SEN. COMM, ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 
95TH CONG., 1ST SESs., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATIONS 113 (Comm. Print 1977). 
233. There are relatively few prior sanctioned additives to animal feed, although the 
FDA did countenance the marketing of DES as an animal feed additive by a few manufac-
turers prior to 1958. The agency has subsequently sought to limit these approvals and to 
extinguish them at any opportunity, e.g., when a manufacturer's plant burned down. The 
few prior sanctioned feed additives are subject to the standards of 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(l) 
(1976). See note 164 supra and accompanying text. 
234. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360b(a), 32l(w) (1976). 
235. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(l), (w)(l) (1976). The 1962 Drug Amendments Act contained 
additional transitional provisions, see Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 107, 76 Stat. 781 (1962). 
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considered potentially applicable to almost all drugs used in food-
producing animals, a significant number of which are suspected 
laboratory animal carcinogens.236 
Precisely for this reason Congress's 1962 modification of the 
Delaney Clause has long been controversial. The FDA has as-
sumed that the amended clause does not automatically forbid 
approval of a carcinogenic drug or animal feed additive simply on 
a finding that its use may result in some residues, however small. 
Rather, the agency contends that the law permits approval if the 
sponsor submits analytical methods capable of measuring-and 
thereby of controlling-any residues that may be unsafe.237 Until 
1977, however, the FDA had not adopted formal criteria for evalu-
ating analytical methods offered to control unsafe residues. It 
reviewed each new drug individually and, generally, required that 
no residues should be detectable by the best analytical method 
then available.238 Because some animal drugs have been tested 
chronically and found carcinogenic only after they were initially 
marketed, however, a few drugs obtained approval on the basis 
of assay methods less sensitive than might now be prescribed.230 
Improvements in analytical chemistry have affected the 
FDA's efforts to control animal drug residues almost as dramati-
cally as its regulation of indirect food additives. The agency has 
initiated proceedings to withdraw approval of DES implants be-
cause the drug has been found to leave residues at levels that 
236. In 1972 Dr. Klemens Johnson, former Director of FDA Bureau of Veterinary 
Medicine's Division of Veterinary Medical Review, prepared a 36-page memorandum 
criticizing the agency's method for detecting drug residues in food animals. Dr. Johnson 
also assembled a list of 19 animal drugs which were potentially carcinogenic but for which 
no adequate method existed for detecting residues. This "Johnson Memorandum" was 
later the target of a congressional investigation that resulted from the Bureau Director's 
attempts to recall and suppress all copies of the memorandum. For a full discussion of 
the memorandum and subsequent investigation, see HEW Review Panel on New Drug 
Regulation, Report of the Special Counsel's Investigation of Allegations Relating to the 
Bureau of Veterinary Medicine Food and Drug Administration 34-82 (May 1977). 
237. Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,086-87. 
238. Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals: Criteria and Procedures for 
Evaluating Assays for Carcinogenic Residues in Edible Products of Animals, 42 Fed. Reg. 
10,412 (1977). 
239. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. OF OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON 
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGO· 
LATORY REFORM 288 (Comm. Print 1976) (nitrofurans); Diethylstilbestrol: Notice of Oppor-
tunity for Hearing on Proposal To Withdraw Approval of New Animal Drug Applications, 
41 Fed. Reg. 1804 (1976) (DES); Regulation of Diethylstilbestrol, iiJ75: Joint Hearing.~ 
Before the Sub comm. on Health of the Sen.ate Comm. on l,abor and Public Wei/ are and 
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm, on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1975) (Johnson Memorandum). 
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cannot be detected by the methods accepted a decade ago.2~0 And, 
as in the case of indirect food additives, the capacity of analytical 
methods to measure even smaller residues will enlarge the class 
of animal drugs and feed additives that are subject to the stric-
tures of the modified Delaney Clause.241 By contrast with the 
Delaney Clause itself, the DES proviso makes the detection of 
residues in edible animal tissues, rather than the addition of the 
compound to animals or their feed, the critical inquiry. This focus 
of the proviso has enabled the FDA to regulate carcinogenic ani-
mal drugs and feed additives in a fashion that might logically be 
applied to other classes of indirect food constituents as well.2~2 In 
a February, 1977 regulation, Criteria and Procedures for Evaluat-
ing Assays for Carcinogenic Residues in Edible Products, 2~3 the 
agency announced the standards it would apply in determining 
the level of residues an assay for a carcinogenic animal drug or 
feed additive must be capable of measuring if the compound is 
to be approved. As reproposed in 1979, the regulation describes 
the agency's current criteria for deciding what residues may 
safely be allowed to go undetected. 244 
The 1979 proposal embodies several basic requirements: 
1. It mandates chronic testing of any compound that the 
FDA concludes may leave carcinogenic residues in human food. m 
2. It dictate~ that the FDA, by extrapolating from the re-
240. See Diethylstilbestrol: Notice of Opportunity for Hearing on Proposal To With-
draw Approval of New Animal Drug Applications, 41 Fed. Reg. 1804 (1976). An initial 
decision by the FDA AdministrlJtive Law Judge has upheld the withdrawal of approval 
of the use of DES. See Proposal To Withdraw Approval of the New Animal Drug Appli-
cation for Diethylstilbestrol, [1978 Transfer Binder] Foon DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) 
iJ 88,198 (1978). 
241. See Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,075-77. 
242. See notes 213-15 supra and accompanying text. 
243. The FDA's February 1977 regulation was set aside by the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia on the ground that the agency had failed to afford 
manufacturers an adequate opportunity to comment on the scientific rationale for its final 
criteria. Animal Health Institute v. Califano, __ F. Supp. __ (D.D.C. 1978). The 
court's opinion, however, does not suggest that the agency's basic approach is suspect. In 
March 1979 the FDA republished its criteria as a proposal and invited further comment. 
Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203. The reproposed criteria and the 
agency's discussion of them differ in only a few details from the version promulgated in 
ostensibly final form two years earlier. Because the 1979 proposal represents the FDA's 
latest statement of its policy respecting carcinogenic animal drugs, however, the balance 
of the discussion in text refers to that document. 
244. While on its face the proposal merely prescribes the standard for detecting 
residues, it effectively sets the criteria for establishing a tolerance. If the FDA-approved 
test cannot detect a residue, that residue is legally not present even if a more sensitive 
analytical technique might detect it. 
245. Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,078-81, 17,084-86. 
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suits of positive chronic tests, e.g., tests that demonstrate carcin-
ogenicity, shall project the level of potential residues in the aver-
age diet (of meat, milk, or eggs) that corresponds to a one in one 
million individual lifetime risk of cancer. The proposal terms this 
risk "acceptable," emphasizing that the risk is only one of many 
to which individuals are exposed and comparable to that posed 
by other materials that are considered safe.248 
3. Finally, the 1979 proposal specifies that before a com-
pound may qe approved, the sponsor must provide the FDA with 
a practicable247 assay method capable of measuring residues at a 
level that will assure that no individual is exposed to greater than 
the extrapolated "acceptable" risk.248 To increase the probability 
that actual residues would not exceed the level prescribed, the 
drug's labeling will specify the scientifically determined period 
prior to slaughter during which the drug should not be adminis-
tered or implanted.249 In substance, the agency is saying that if 
the potential residues of a carcinogenic animal drug in food will 
not increase any individual's chance of getting cancer by more 
than one in one million, those residues may be ignored. 
Like the February, 1977 regulation, the 1979 proposal does 
not contemplate that the FDA will balance the risks and benefits 
of animal drugs or feed additives. It simply specifies a maximum 
level of risk-expressed as a level of drug residues that the ap-
proved assay method might theoretically fail to detect-which 
the agency will consider "acceptable." For most carcinogenic ani-
mal drugs and feed additives, the sensitivity of an acceptable 
assay-and thus the level of "permissible" undetectable resi-
dues-will have to be in the very low parts-per-billion range. This 
246. Id. at 17,087-93. The only statutory support for the FDA's .designation of an 
"acceptable risk" of 1 in 1,000,000 is the obligation imposed by the DES proviso to develop 
some criteria for approving assay methods. The FDA stated that such a risk level could 
be considered of insignificant public health concern because it was the maximum, and 
therefore unlikely, human risk level. Id. at 17,092. The specified level of risk is the risk 
for an individual who consumes the maximum residue levels every day over a lifetime, 
and that level assumes that meat products constitute one-third of the total human diet. 
From these conservative assumptions, the FDA believes that the most likely human risk 
is several orders of magnitude less than the theoretical "acceptable risk." Id. 
247. Id. at 17,098-101. 
248. In some cases, the test sensitivity prescribed will be only indirectly related to 
the acceptable level of residue. Because many animal drug residues are metabolic by-
products of the ingested drug, the presence of any residue is often calculated from mea-
surements of these by-products. 
249. Id. at 17,101-03. The proposal specifies, it should be noted, that the approved 
assay method must reveal no detectable residues when a drug is used as intended. Other-
wise, the drug cannot be approved. 
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will strain, and perhaps exceed, the capability of most analytical 
methods currently approved for animal drugs.250 
3. Pesticide residues 
Residues of chemicals used to control animals and insects 
that threaten crops constitute a third class of undesired but not 
unexpected food constituents. Pesticide residues often remain on 
raw agricultural commodities after they have been harv:ested and 
prepared for consumer purchase without further procef:lsing. Resi-
dues also appear in processed foods made from raw commodities 
to which pesticides have been applied. As is outlined below, the 
present law treats these two situations differently.251 
Federal regulation of pesticide residues differs from the pat-
tern of the categories of food constituents previously discussed 
because the primary responsibility for determining permissible 
levels of human exposure rests with the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, not with the FDA.252 Most pesticides are subject to 
250. Relying on its understanding of Congress's objective in enacting the original 
Delaney Clause, the FDA's 1977 regulation specified that if a practicable assay were 
developed that was more sensitive than the agency's criteria demanded, it would require 
that the new method be used. 42 Fed. Reg. at 10,418-19. The FDA's preamble conceded 
that the legislative history of the DES proviso provides no clear indication of Congress's 
intent. One interpretation of the· DES proviso is that it merely permits the use of drugs 
that have conclusively been shown to leave no residues. The agency rejected this interpre-
tation on the ground that it would render the clause a "Catch-22" because modern meth-
ods Qf chemical analysis have confirmed that any drug will leave some residues, albeit 
perhaps below the level of detection. 
The FDA's 1977 decision was controversial: One of the regulation's objectives was to 
provide some stability in the regulation of animal drugs, and to forestall continuous 
pressure to develop even more sensitive methods for detecting residues. The agency's 
decision would not have avoided the uncertainty posed by the possible development of 
new assays capable of detecting residues below the "acceptable risk" level. Without ex-
planation, the 1979 proposal omits the qualification that the FDA may later demand use 
of a more sensitive assay than the one required by the agency's criteria. 
251. Residues may also contaminate commodities other than those on which pesti-
cides are used, through drift following initial application or persistence in the environ-
ment. When this occurs, the FDA currently regulates the residues as environmental con-
taminants under §§ 402(a) and 406, 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a), 346 (1976). Thus, a single 
pesticide may be subject to regulation under both § 406 and § 408 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 346, 346a (1976). But see United States v. Ewig Bros. Co., 502 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1974). 
The discussion here exclusively concerns federal efforts to regulate residues on raw agricul-
tural commodities for which a pesticide has been specifically approved and residues in 
processed foods derived from those commodities. 
252. Responsibility for this function formerly rested with the FDA, and authority to 
register pesticides with the Department of Agriculture. See Reukauf, Regulation of Agri-
cultural Pesticides, 62 lowA L. REv. 909, 910-11 (1977). The reassignment in 1970 of 
authority for establishing tolerances under § 408 still left the FDA with primary responsi-
bility for monitoring marketed foods to assure compliance within EPA tolerances. Reorg. 
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 84 Stat. 2086, reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. app. II, at 60 (Supp. 1979). 
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regulation under two statutes. The Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)253 requires licensure of any 
pesticide distributed for use in the United States. Sections 408 
and 402(a)(2)(B) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act forbid the 
distribution of raw or processed foods bearing pesticide residues 
that have not been sanctioped by the EPA. 2.54 The safety of food 
for human consumption is the concern of the latter provisions. 
Under FIFRA, every pesticide used in the United States 
must be "registered," i.e., licensed, by the EPA.255 A pesticide 
"shall" be registered if, in addition to meeting other requirements 
not pertinent here, "when used in accordance with widespread 
and commonly recognized practice it will not generally cause un-
reasonable adverse effects on the environment."2.5s Congress has 
defined this standard to forbid "any unreasonable risk to man or 
the environment, taking into account the economic, social and 
environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide."257 
Under this broad language, the EPA considers the full range of a 
pesticide's possible health effects, including its capacity to in-
duce cancer,258 and is empowered, indeed obligated, to weigh 
against these risks a pesticide's ability in eradicating pests and 
promoting food production.259 FIFRA does not preclude registra-
tion of a pesticide that induces cancer in laboratory animals, 
although the EPA has relied on such evidence to terminate regis-
tration of several compounds and has established a presumption 
against initial or continuing registration of pesticides that are 
recognized or suspect animal carcinogens. 260 In the registration 
253. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136 (1976). In 1972, Congress substantially revamped the exist-
ing statutory scheme for pesticide control when it passed the Federal Environmental 
Pesticide Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified in scattered 
sections of 7, 15, & 21 U.S.C.). That law provided a transitional period to permit re-
registration, in accordance with new, more demanding standards of safety, of all pesticides . 
previously registered under FIFRA. In 1978, Congress again amended the statutory 
scheme for pesticides control to permit the conditional registration of pesticides while the 
data necessary for complete registration is being generated. The amendments also seek 
to expedite the registration process by permitting the EPA to register pesticides on a 
generic basis. See Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819. 
254. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(2), 346a(a) (1976). 
255. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1976). 
256. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5) (1976). 
257. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(bb) (1976). 
258. Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41 
Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976). 
259. Id. See also Regulations for the Enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act, 40 C.F.R. § 162.11 (1978). 
260. The EPA has established a set of rebuttable presumptions against registration 
to aid in determining whether a pesticide is likely to cause unreasonable adverse effects. 
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process, the EPA is concerned principally with the health of per-
sons exposed to the pesticide during its application, while har-
vesting or transporting crops, or in the environment generally. 
The agency regulates the compound's risks as a potential contam-
inant of food under sections 408 and 409 of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act. 
A pesticide that is applied to a commodity consumed by 
humans might "reasonably be expected to become a compo-
nent"261 of food, whether the commodity is marketed in a raw 
state or after processing. To exclude pesticide residues from its 
compass, the statutory definition of food additive excepts pesti-
cide chemicals "in or on a raw agricultural commodity," and thus 
exempts such constituents of food from the requirements of sec-
tion 409.262 At the same time, section 402(a)(2)(B) of the Act 
deems a food adulterated "if it is a raw agricultural commodity 
and it bears or contains a pesticide chemical which is unsafe 
within the meaning of section 408(a)."263 This provision was 
added to the Act in 1954 as part of the legislation that authorized 
the FDA to establish tolerances for residues of registered pesti-
cides on raw agricultural commodities.264 Pursuant to this author-
ity, which appears in section 408 of the Act, the EPA determines 
the quantity of a pesticide that may remain on a raw commodity 
when it enters interstate commerce. While FIFRA requires the 
registration of all pesticides, section 408(a) of the Food, Drug, .and 
A rebuttable presumption arises if the pesticide exceeds specified criteria for any of three 
types of effects: (1) acute toxicity; (2) chronic toxicity; or (3) lack of emergency treatments 
for exposed humans. Chronic toxicity is defined in terms of oncogenic (carcinogenic) or 
mutagenic effects. These rebuttable presumptions shift to the applicant or registrant the 
burden of demonstrating for a pesticide initially found to be chronically toxic that (1) 
when considered with proposed restrictions on use and common practices of use, the 
pesticide will not concentrate, persist, or accrue to levels to have any significant chronic 
adverse effects; or (2) that the EPA's determination that it exceeds the criteria for risk 
was in error. In addition, the applicant may submit evidence to demonstrate that the 
economic, social, and environmental benefits of the use-of the pesticide outweigh the risk 
of use. See 40 C.F.R. § 162.45 (1978). 
While the EPA is particularly attentive to the carcinogenic potential of pesticides, 
see Health Risk and Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected Carcinogens, 41 Fed. 
Reg. 21,402 (1976), the agency may still permit registration of a carcinogenic pesticide if 
its economic benefits outweigh the health risk. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGA-
TONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., 
FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM 198 (Comm. Print 1976) (letter of Russell 
Train, Director of EPA). 
261. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (1976). 
262. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(l) (1976). 
263. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (1976). 
264. Act of July 22, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-518, § 2, 68 Stat. 511 (1954)(current version 
at 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(B) (1976)). 
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Cosmetic Act requires a tolerance only for "[a]ny poisonous or 
deleterious pesticide chemical which is not generally recognized 
. . . as safe for use. " 265 Accordingly, residues of a pesticide that 
are GRAS do not require formal government approval. 266 
Section 408(b) prescribes the criteria the EPA must use to 
establish tolerances: 
[T]he Secretary shall give appropriate consideration, among 
other relevant factors, (1) to the necessity for the production of an 
adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply; (2) to the other 
ways in which the consumer may be affected by the same pesticide 
chemical or by other substances that are poisonous or deleterious; 
and (3) to the opinion [of the Secretary of Agriculture as] submit-
ted with a certmcation of usefulness [of the pesticide] .... In 
carrying out the provisions of this section relating to the establish-
ment of tolerances, the Secretary may establish the tolerance ap-
plicable with respect to the use of any pesticide chemical' in or 
on any raw agricultural commodity at zero level if the scientific 
data before the Secretary does not justify the establishment of a 
greater tolerance.267 
Conspicuously, this language does not mention the risk of 
cancer, and since a pesticide residue on a raw commodity is ex-
cepted from the definition of a food additive, 268 the Delaney 
Clause does not apply. The EPA could, therefore, establish a 
finite tolerance for a pesticide that has been shown to induce 
cancer in experimental animals (indeed in man) but that, be-
cause of its utility, remains eligible for registration under 
FIFRA.269 In short, the Act permits the approval of constituents 
of food-residues of pesticides on raw commodities-that could 
not lawfully be added as direct ingredients. This inconsistency is 
amplified by the Act's distinctive treatment of pesticide residues 
in processed foods. 
While many types of processing substantially reduce the lev-
els of pesticide residues on raw agricultural commodities, few 
265. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (1976). 
266. Few pesticides qualify for this exception because by design, they are biologically 
active substances capable of causing adverse effects in living organisms. 
267. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1976). 
268. See note 262 supra and accompanying text. 
269. So far as I am aware, this has rarely occurred. One recent example occurred in 
the summer of 1977, when the EPA authorized the use of a carcinogenic pesticide, BAAM, 
on two critical crops in Oregon and Idaho. 42 Fed. Reg. 37,437 (1977). A similar exemption 
was granted in February 1978 for certain crops in California and Utah. 43 Fed. Reg. 5884 
(1978). In both cases, the EPA determined that the economic consequences of failing to 
permit the pesticide's use outweighed the minimal health hazard of its limited use and 
occurrence as residues in foods. 
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processes eliminate all such residues.27° Congress therefore recog-
nized that some provision was needed to control pesticide resi-
dues that persist on raw commodities used to make finished 
foods, e.g., canned vegetables. Accordingly, the exception for pes-
ticide chemicals in the Act's definition of food additive extends 
only to residues "in or on a raw agricultural commodity. "271 A 
pesticide residue on a pro~essed food, unless it is GRAS or prior 
sanctioned, is a food additive which therefore adulterates food if 
no regulation approves its presence.272 
A processed food containing any residue of a pesticide for 
which the EPA has not established a tolerance on the raw com-
modity is adulterated under section 402(a)(2)(C) of the Act.273 -
But if such a tolerance has been established, Congress dispenses 
with the requirement that the pesticide in the processed food also 
be approved under section 409-if certain conditions are met.274 
These conditions are set out in a proviso to section 402(a)(2)(C), 
which was added in 1958 and states: 
Provided, That where a pesticide chemical has been used in or on 
a raw agricultural commodity in conformity with an exemption 
granted or a tolerance prescribed under section 408 and such raw 
agricultural commodity has been subjected to processing such as 
canning, cooking, freezing, dehydrating, or milling, the residue of 
such pesticide chemical remaining in or on s~ch processed food 
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 406 and 409, not 
be deemed unsafe if such residue in or on the raw agricultural 
commodity has been removed to the extent possible in good manu-
facturing practice and the concentration of such residue in the 
processed food when ready to eat is not greater than the tolerance 
prescribed for the raw agricultural commodity . . . . 275 
The Act thus condones pesticide residues for which a tolerance 
has been established if that tolerance is not exceeded when the 
raw commodity is processed. This means that if the EPA estab-
270. See Cancer-Causing Chemicals-Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1978). 
271. See note 262 supra and accompanying text. 
272. See text at notes 113-39 supra. 
273. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976). 
274. The legislative history of the 1958 Food Additive Amendments does not explain 
why Congress chose to exempt pesticide residues on processed foods. Presumably it con-
cluded that the evaluation of safety performed under § 408 adequately protected consum-
ers so long as the amount of residue did not exceed that authorized for the raw commodity. 
But no evidence -suggests that Congress was sensitive to the fact that the applicable 
criteria for evaluation under§§ 408 and 409 are not the same. 
275. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976). 
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lishes a finite tolerance for a carcinogenic pesticide on a raw 
commodity, that pesticide may lawfully appear in the processed 
food in a quantity that does not exceed the toler-
ance-"notwithstanding," as the proviso states, the Delaney 
Clause. 
One further example illustrates the exquisite, if arcane, rela-
tionship between section 409 and the provisions of the Act appli-
cable to pesticides. Although processing may reduce the residues 
of a pesticide on a raw commodity, it may sometimes concentrate 
the residues by shrinking the volume of solid material.270 When 
this occurs, the proviso to section 402(a)(2)(C) is not satisfied and 
the quantity of the pesticide that exceeds the section 408 toler-
ance is considered a food additive.277 In such a case, a distributor 
of the processed food needs a food additive regulation to prevent 
the food from being considered adulterated and, to obtain such a 
regulation, must demonstrate, with reasonable certainty, that the 
quantity of the pesticide is safe. 278 Many food additive regulations 
authorizing concentrated pesticide residues have been promul-
gated by the EPA, which is also responsible for implementing this 
facet of the Food Additives Amendment because it is familiar 
with the safety data submitted to support tolerances under sec-
tion 408.279 
Suppose that the EPA established a tolerance for a pesticide 
on raw cabbage at ten parts per million. Suppose further that the 
pesticide induces cancer in animals but, because of its import-
ance in controlling crop pests, :the EPA maintains its registration. 
Under the proviso to section 402(a)(2)(C), up to ten parts per 
million of this carcinogenic "additive" may lawfully appear in 
food. But if residues of the pesticide concentrated during process-
ing, any quantity in excess of ten parts per million would consti-
tute an "unsafe food additive" and, under the Delaney Clause, 
presumably could not be approved.280 However, if the EPA were 
to raise the tolerance for raw cabbage to a level that the residues 
in the processed cabbage would not exceed, 281 in a legal sense the 
276. Cancer-Causing Chemicals-Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Over• 
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1978). 
277. See 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(C) (1976). 
278. See text at notes 112-28 supra. 
279. See 21 C.F.R. § 193 (1978). 
280. In administering§ 409 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the EPA is presum-
ably bound by the Delaney Clause, as the FDA would be. 
281. The EPA would of course have to determine that this higher level would meet 
the more general safety criteria of§ 408 of the Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1976), 
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food additive would disappear-and the Delaney Clause would 
not preclude marketing the treated cabbage! 
It should be noted that even a zero tolerance for a carcino-
genic pesticide does not assure that no residues will appear on the 
raw commodity or in processed food. Effective enforcement of a 
zero tolerance depends on growers' and food producers' obser-
vance of meticulous processing standards and intensive FDA 
monitoring. The FDA simply lacks the inspectional capability to 
guarantee that no commodities containing measurable, and thus 
illegal, pesticide residues reach consumers. Moreover, even lot-
by-lot monitoring would suffer from the limits of the analytical 
methods for measuring pesticide residues. In reality, therefore, a 
zero tolerance may be considered a finite tolerance, established 
at the level that available analytical methods can measure. This 
is true for any unintended constituent of food whose occurrence 
cannot be effectively controlled or whose benefits are thought to 
justify its continued use. 
The procedure for obtaining a tolerance for pesticide residues 
on a raw commodity resembles the procedure for obtaining ap-
proval of a food additive, with one significant difference. The 
EPA on its own initiative may, or at the petitioner's request must, 
submit the petition to an advisory committee of experts ap-
pointed by the National Academy of Sciences for evaluation and 
recommendation.282 The Act provides an opportunity for a formal 
evidentiary hearing before the EPA may refuse to establish a 
tolerance, although few petitioners have ever requested a hear-
ing. 283 The EPA must follow the same procedures in revoking or 
modifying a tolerance once established. When petitioned to 
promulgate a food additive regulation authorizing a residue on 
a processed food in excess of that sanctioned for the raw com-
modity, the EPA must follow the same procedures as those that 
apply to the FDA. 284 
N. CONCLUSION 
This Article describes the ways in which current federal law 
attempts to assure that food is safe for human consumption. It 
should be obvious even to the casual reader that safety, in this 
case, is an objective, rather than a reality. The law's efforts to 
make food safe are inevitably tempered by competing considera-
282. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d)(3)(5) (1976). 
283. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(d)(5) (1976). 
284. See text at notes 132-39 supra. 
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tions, such as a desire to retain traditional foods, the wish to 
produce food abundantly and cheaply, and practical limitations 
on our ability to detect or eliminate contaminants. As the preced-
ing sections demonstrate, however, Congress has not simply in-
structed the FDA to attain the optimum mix of benefits and risks 
in controlling consumer exposure to possibly toxic food constitu-
ents. Rather, Congress has divided the universe of food constitu-
ents into several categories, and specified different, occasionally 
inconsistent, criteria for regulating each of them. In a fl;lw in-
stances, these criteria reflect a definitive congressional assess-
ment of the risks and benefits of a category of constituents as a 
class. More often, they specify the primary objective-safety-
and leave other considerations unmentioned. 
In general, the Act's food safety requirements are intended 
to minimize risk. Congress has usually instructed the FDA to 
restrict or ban any food or food constituent that might expose any 
significant number of consumers to a risk of harm-regardless, 
presumably, of any countervailing benefits. But the qualifier, 
"presumably," is important: Congress often appears to have ig-
nored the question of competing benefits because it assumed that 
few constituents of food, natural or added, would pose significant 
risks. For example, in 1938 Congress probably believed that most 
agricultural commodities-if adequately protected from man-
made filth-would be perfectly safe for virtually all consumers.285 
The present law, however, is not naive. While the FDA has 
sometimes had to interpret the Act imaginatively,288 its general 
structure reflects an awareness of the competing interests. The 
285. Alternatively, Congress m~y simply have concluded that the interests involved 
in producing agricultural commodities were so substantial that only a showing of a serious 
risk could justify regulatory action against a staple of the American diet. Congress ob• 
viously intended to make it more difficult for the FDA to regulate naturally occurring 
constituents of familiar foods. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text. Indeed, it 
could be said that many of the categories recognized by the current law reflect implicit 
congressional risk-benefit judgments. For example, it is possible to interpret the statutory 
definition of food additive-including the exceptions for GRAS substances and prior sanc-
tioned ingredients-with § 409's high standard for approval as representing a similar risk-
benefit judgment, in this instance a judgment that no synthesized new ingredient was 
likely to prevent benefits that would justify any risk. To the extent that such policies must 
be inferred from the structure of the statute, rather than stated in its terms and legislative 
history, however, the present law can fairly be criticized for lack of candor. 
286. The collection of provisions found in the original 1938 act-§§ 402(a)(l), 
402(a)(2)(A), and 406-have posed the greatest challenge to the agency's ingenuity. No 
theory of statutory construction can satisfactorily reconcile these provisions. The difficul-
ties the FDA has encountered are apparent from its analysis in Poisonous or Deleterious 
Substances in Food: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 Fed. Reg. 42,743 (1974). See notes 
91-92 supra and accompanying text. 
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central distinction between "added" and other constituents, I 
suggest, recognizes both important differences in government's 
ability to control exposure to constituents and in the "benefits" 
that are popularly ascribed to various classes of foods. For exam-
ple, I suspect that most consumers of potatoes would prefer them 
to almost any synthesized source of carbohydrates containing 
fewer potentially toxic constituents. Similarly, Congress's estab-
lishment of separate licensing systems for pesticide residues, food 
and color additives, and animal drugs is not only a logical re-
sponse to concerns about the risks posed by different classes of 
"added" constituents, but might be adopted again if the law were 
rewritten today. 287 
That the Act permits the FDA to treat environmental con-
taminants as "added" to food may weaken the statute's candor, 
but this arrangement grew largely from the FDA's desire to estab-
lish an administrative mechanism for determining the level of 
exposure that is compatible with consumer health.and technolog-
ical reality, rather than to leave the issue to individual judges in 
suits to enforce the Act's general prohibition against adulterated 
food. Whatever one thinks of the agency's handling of specific 
contaminants, an approach to setting tolerances similar to the 
one it has devised under section 406 seems a logical way to cope 
with the probleiµ. 
But though the Act can be considered rational in its general 
structure, the current system for regulating food safety is under 
enormous strain. The causes of this, I believe, require that consid-
eration be given to revi,sing the current law. A subse.quent article 
will describe the detailed features of a revised statute, but the 
reasons for considering revision may be suggested here. 
First, the public is increasingly aware that large numbers of 
foods contain constituents that pose risks to health. This aware-
ness comprehends that manufactured foods contain suspicious 
chemical preservatives and other synthesized ingredients, and 
that even natural constituents of home-grown fruits and vegeta-
bles may pose risks. And it recognizes the danger in the! growing 
category of substances that become or, in the words of the Act, 
287. While one might for administrative convenience retain separate statutory sys-
tems for regulating these constituents, there is little basis for the minor procedural differ-
ences that appear in the current provisions of the law. See notes 132-39, 229, 282-84 supra 
and accompanying text. More fundamentally, as suggested below, text at note 288 infra, 
there is no obvious reason why different substantive standards should apply to pesticide 
residues, animal drugs, and food contact materials-"indirect" constituents that present 
similar problems of control and provide comparable benefits. 
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"may reasonably be expected to become," components of food 
through their use in packaging, pest control, or livestock produc-
tion. Second, although such generalizations are treacherous, 
there is a popular appreciation of the benefits associated with 
some of these risk-creating constituents. Certainly there is more 
emphasis on developing and using technologies that make food 
abundant, cheap, and easy to transport and prepare. 
These developments complicate regulatory decisions, be-
cause they have not produced, nor been accompanied by, a na-
tional consensus about what kinds of benefits are important and 
what kinds of risk are acceptable. Regional and ethnic differences 
in diet have given way to strongly-held, widely dispersed prefer-
ences for special types of foods ranging from synthesized diet 
foods to organically grown vegetables. Increasing variations in 
dietary preferences have been accompanied by national produc-
tion and marketing of food, which make it more difficult for indi-
vidual consumers to control the source of their foods, and more 
difficult for government regulators to identify the mix of benefits 
and risks that will satisfy the majority of the population. Further-
more, regulation abhors diversity. It is difficult for an agency to 
develop, and more difficult for it to implement, a policy that 
permits regional or social disparities in levels of individual expo-
sure to risk. And it would be virtually impossible to justify such 
a policy in the Washington environment, where the insistent 
demand is to protect the most vulnerable. 
The strains on the present system stem also from basic flaws, 
both substantive and procedural, in the law itself. While the Act's 
dichotomy between added and naturally occurring constituents 
may make sense, within categories of constituents the statute 
i:ecognizes distinctions that cannot be justified as sound policy, 
and that allow the threshold classification of a substance to dic-
tate its regulatory fate. For example, the Act divides the broad 
category of intentional ingredients into those used to color foods 
and those used for other purposes. The Color Additive Amend-
ments establish a "positive list" system for regulating food colors: 
no color may be used which the FDA has not approved, following 
testing by the users. The Food Additives Amendment, by con-
trast, exempts ingredients that are GRAS, makes no provision for 
transition to food additive status, and provides apparently indefi-
nite protection for ingredients once approved, however, casually, 
by the FDA or the USDA. 
The distinction among the three primary categories of indi-
rect food constituents-pesticide residues, indirect food addi-
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tives, and animal drugs-are perhaps even less justifiable. In 
establishing tolerances for pesticides on raw commodities, the 
EPA may, and does, consider economic benefits. No such inquiry 
is permitted in regulating an indirect food additive. And the FDA 
maintains, I believe correctly, that the benefits of an animal drug 
may not lawfully be considered in deciding how much, if any, of 
it may remain in human food.288 The disparities are even more 
exquisite when one considers the Delaney Clause. The clause does 
not prevent the approval of a carcinogen in the form of a pesticide 
residue. Nor does it prohibit the approval of a _ carcinogenic 
animal drug, so long as any residue in food escapes detection. 
But the clause unequivocally forbids the approval of any carcino-
genic packaging material that may conceivably migrate to food. 
All of these substances are used to enhance food production, han-
dling, or storage. If a residue contaminates food, it makes no 
difference, in terms of human risk, where the residue came from. 
And no one of these sources is notably difficult to control or more 
costly to forgo. 
The Delaney Clause produces strain of its own as the dispute 
over saccharin reveals. While one may argue the principle of De-
laney-either as an operational statement of scientific knowledge 
or as a way of preventing the FDA from succumbing to the pres-
sures of food producers-it causes problems because it applies 
unevenly. A prior sanction can reprieve a vulnerable, but impor-
tant carcinogen, such as sodium nitrite. Similarly, calling an 
added substance "unavoidable" may qualify it for more flexible 
treatment under section 406. And I have already alluded to the 
different ways in which Delaney applies to indirect constituents 
of food. The exceptions to Delaney in, or read into, the Act exert 
enormous pressure to find an escape route when an important 
substance is discovered to be an animal carcinogen. 
Another flaw in the present statute is its consistent failure 
to define the FDA's authority to consider criteria other than risk. 
Section 402(a) is a case in point. The Act does not indicate 
whether, in determining whether a food naturally containing a 
288. See Assays for Carcinogenic Residues, supra note 203, at 17,075 where the Com-
missioner observed that, aside from §§ 406 and 408, "the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act contains no provision requiring the Commissioner to consider costs or technical 
feasibility in making any safety decision, including any decision involving cancer-causing 
chemicals ..•• " After analyzing the so-called DES proviso, the Commisioner concluded: 
From this statutory structure and language, it is evident that any consideration 
of feasibility and costs is subsidiary to the overriding congressional purpose to 
permit no additional human cancer risk from food additives, color additives, or 
animal drugs. 
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toxic substance is likely to be "ordinarily injurious," the FDA 
may consider the food's long use, its popularity, or its economic 
importance. Presumably not, but the statute does not say, and 
as more natural constituents are discovered to be toxic at some 
level, the pressure on the FDA to give weight to these statutorily 
extraneous, but obviously important, factors will increase. The 
same point can be made about section 409 of the Act, which 
specifies that the FDA must find a food additive safe and func-
tional, but does not state whether other considerations may enter 
into its judgment. Here the agency has been explicit; it will not 
consider an additive's benefits in determining whether it satisfies 
the basic safety standard. The Act's failure to specify the criteria 
that the FDA may legitimately weigh invites ingenuity in statu-
tory interpretation when a flat "no risk" standard seems likely to 
produce an unpopular result. 
The Act contains significant procedural flaws as well. The 
variety of substantive standards governing food constituents is 
paralleled by an even more striking variation among the statuto-
rily prescribed procedures for reaching regulatory decisions. To 
establish that a natural constituent renders a food "ordinarily 
injurious" under the second clause of section 402(a)(l), the FDA 
must marshal expert testimony in court to prove its contention 
by a preponderance of the evidence. This process theoretically 
must be repeated each time the agency seeks to enforce its view 
against another distributor or shipment of the food. The Act does 
not expressly authorize it to issue regulations defining the levels 
of a natural constituent that will adulterate a food. 
In regulating contaminants, by contrast, section 406 empow-
ers the FDA to establish tolerances that determine conclusively 
when a food is adulterated. Tolerances are set through formal 
rulemaking under section 701(e) of the Act, a complex and costly 
process which the United States Administrative Conference has 
sharply criticized. 289 This procedure requires a proposal, oppor-
tunity for comment, publication of "final" regulation, opportun-
ity for objections, and, if justified, a formal evidentiary hearing, 
followed by an administrative law judge's initial decision and the 
opportunity for an appeal to the Commissioner. Variations of this 
process are prescribed for establishing pesticide tolerances and to 
approving food additives, color additives, and animal drugs. 
The foregoing description of the formal process overstates the 
FDA's actual burden. A food distributor's inclination to assert its 
289. See generally Hamilton, supra note 103. 
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statutory right to a formal hearing depends largely on the conse-
quences of a delay in the agency's decision and the costs of partic-
ipating in the proceeding. It is extremely rare for a petitioner for 
a food or color additive or a manufacturer of an animal drug to 
insist upon a hearing when the FDA appears disinclined to ap-
prove its product for initial marketing. Ordinarily it is faster and 
less expensive to conduct any additional tests the agency de-
mands or to modify the use of the product to conform to the data 
already submitted. Since 1938, no manufacturer of an animal 
drug or petitioner for a new color additive has demanded a formal 
hearing at the initial approval stage. Only two such requests have 
been made for hearings on food additive petitions.290 The EPA's 
experience under section 408 is similar. 
By contrast, when the Act requires an opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing before the FDA can limit exposure to a prod-
uct, e.g., before it may withdraw approval of an animal drug or 
establish a tolerance for a contaminant, the incentives for distrib-
utors to insist upon the full procedures mandated by statute are 
much greater. Hearings have been requested on the last two color 
additives for which the FDA withdrew approval.291 The manufac-
turers of DES have engaged the agency in a hearing on the pro-
posed withdrawal of that compound for more than three years.292 
A requested hearing on the FDA's proposed toleranc~ for PCBs 
in paper packaging has been pending for nearly five years while 
the agency has attempted to forge a settlement that will avert the 
formal statutory procedure.293 
290. The two instances involve cyclamate, for which a food additive petition was filed 
several years after FDA's initial determination that it was no longer GRAS, and aspar-
tame, another artificial sweetener, which the FDA originally approved, then delayed, for 
marketing pending a hearing requested by two public opponents of its use, whose interest 
lay in prolonging the administrative process. See notes 135-36, 155 supra and accompany-
ing text. 
291. The hearings involved FDC Red No. 2 and FDC Red No. 4. Technically, the . 
hearing in each instance was on the FDA's refusal to permanently list the color. See 41 
Fed. Reg. 15,053 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 41,867 (1976). Both colors had previously been 
provisionally listed and in use since 1960. Thus, the practical effect of the agency's deci-
sion was to withdraw approval-and the predicted incentives to challenge the decisions 
were operative. Because of the peculiar procedures applicable to provisionally listed col-
ors, however, the FDA's decision in both instances became effective before the hearing was 
held. 
292. See note 240 supra and accompanying text. The proceeding commenced with the 
publication of a notice of opportunity for hearing in January 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 1804 
(1976), following a court decision ruling that the FDA's earlier attempt to withdraw 
approval of the drug without a hearing was invalid. See Hess & Clark, Div. of Rhodia, 
Inc. v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
293. The proceeding is described in Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) in Paper 
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The FDA's realization that a hearing will usually be re-
quested when it will delay and possibly avert regulation has led 
it to rely primarily on "action levels" to limit exposure to environ-
mental contaminants. The agency asserts that a proposed toler-
ance may serve as an action level pending completion of formal 
rulemaking294-and thereby escapes any pressure to finish setting 
the tolerance. For many contaminants the FDA has relied exclu-
sively on action levels, which are established simply by publica-
tion in the Federal Register. 295 
The FDA has thus minimized the costs of the Act's proce-
dural requirements, but it has done so at a price. The agency 
makes most decisions to approve the use or occurrence of food 
constituents without hearing public comment and often without 
explaining the reasons for its judgments. It ordinarily approves 
food additives simply by publishing in the Federal Register a 
regulation specifying the terms of the approval and reciting that 
the additive has been found safe. The supporting safety data are 
evaluated privately, except on those rare occasions when a mem-
ber of the public comes to the agency to evaluate the petition. 
The process for approving new animal drugs is likewise effectively 
closed to public review. When the FDA announces an action level 
for a contaminant, it makes available the data supporting its 
decision and permits access to its internal analysis of risk, avoida-
bility, and detectability, but it accepts no responsibility to re-
spond to any comments it might receive.296 
Neither Congress nor the FDA has seriously explored regula-
tory options other than mandatory limitations on exposure· to 
potentially toxic constituents of food. Notably, the Act in most 
instances does not contemplate the possibility that label warn-
ings or another form of consumer information might be a more 
discriminating means of regulating consumer exposure.207 For 
example, neither section 409's general safety clause nor the Dela-
ney Clause appears to permit the FDA to allow the use of a 
possibly toxic but useful additive, accompanied by label warnings 
Food-Packaging Material; Order Ruling on Objections and Hearing Regarding Temporary 
Tolerance, 40 Fed. Reg. 11°,563 (1975). 
294. See 21 C.F.R. § 109.6(d) (1978). 
295. Id. at§ 109.4(b)(2); 42 Fed. Reg. 52,817 (1977). 
296. See Poisonous or Deleterious Substances, 21 C.F.R. § 109.4(b)(2); 42 Fed. Reg. 
52,814, 52,817 (1977). 
297. For a more detailed, though ultimately unconvincing, discussion of the possible 
range of regulatory approaches, including labeling, see Institute of Medicine of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, Food Safety Policy: Scientific and Societal Considerations 
8-1 through 8-13 (1979). 
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on the product. The agency has proposed to do this in the case of 
hair dyes containing 4-methoxy-m-phenylenediamine, an animal 
carcinogen, but its proposal clearly indicates that this approach 
is a second best alternative to banning the substance altogether, 
which the Act does not allow.298 The difficulty of devising a genu-
inely informative label for potentially hazardous constituents, 
such as saccharin, while protecting consumers who cannot or sim-
ply do not read labels, may ultimately force abandonment of this 
approach, but it is one that merits investigation. 
This Article does not purport to solve the problems raised by 
the Act's treatment of toxic substances in food. I reserve specific 
recommendations for the Act's revision for a subsequent article. 
At this juncture I will simply conclude with suggested objectives 
for statutory reform. First, any new system for regulating food 
safety must explicitly recognize the special role that food plays 
in our society. Food provides the nutrients essential for health, 
but it also underpins many important traditions and accompa-
nies many important ceremonies. Modest risks associated with 
foods that have little importance for most consumers ought to be 
considered more serious than greater hazards in foods that enjoy 
a long acceptance. A system of regulation that attempts to ration 
exposure to risks in food based solely on some mathematical for-
mula will quickly encounter problems that it cannot resolve. 
Second, any new system must explicitly recognize the gov-
ernment's inability to obtain complete information about risk or 
benefits before a regulatory choice must be made. Adequate data 
can be obtained about the safety of compounds that are not yet 
in use and which have commercial sponsors. But problems loom 
as soon as a compound is approved and become more serious as 
scientific advances erode the original grounds for approval. 
Shortage of data becomes most serious when the government 
attempts to control constituents whose presence in food is not 
desired or readily controllable, and for which, therefore, there 
are no petitioners. The FDA must often determine the market-
ability of contaminated food long before data are available to 
support definitive judgment. Yet its initial judgment must be 
definitive, at least for the moment, if the agency is to control 
human exposure effectively. And its decisions must be subject 
to revision without substantial cost and delay. 
Third, any revised system should simplify the procedures for 
reaching regulatory decisions and force regulators to explain the 
298. See 43 Fed. Reg. 1101 (1978) and note 232 supra. 
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scientific bases and policies that underlie their determinations. 
Finally, Congress should exhaustively describe the criteria 
regulators may consult and should specify those that are to be 
ignored. No regulator should be left to determine without legisla-
tive guidance whether consumers want cheaper peanut butter 
and more aflatoxin, more expensive fish and a re(\uction in expo-
sure to PCBs and mercury, or artificially sweetened soft drinks 
accompanied by a heightened risk of bladder cancer. 
